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Foreword
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, with support from 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
hosted a conference on Maritime Confidence Building 
Measures in the South China Sea. 
The conference was held on 11–13 August 2013 in Sydney. 
It was attended by delegates from 16 countries and chaired 
by Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute.
The conference objective was to develop proposals for 
prospective maritime confidence building measures (MCBMs) 
for the South China Sea.
The conference assessed the potential for increased maritime 
cooperation in the South China Sea in functional areas, 
such as law enforcement, search and rescue, hydrographic 
surveying, humanitarian assistance, marine safety, 
fisheries, marine environmental protection, and marine 
scientific research.
The conference examined possible procedures for avoiding 
and managing incidents that might occur at sea between 
ships and aircraft of different countries.
This Special Report opens with the speech presented by 
Senator Bob Carr, then Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.
It includes the keynote address by Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal, 
Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries and Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff.
The report sets out three background papers prepared for 
the conference by Dr Sam Bateman, Professorial Fellow at the 
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, 
University of Wollongong, and Captain Justin Jones, RAN, the 
Director of the Sea Power Centre – Australia.
The report includes a paper on trust and MCBMs by Mr 
Kwa Chong Guan, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies in Singapore, as well as the conference 
dinner speech on MCBMs in the Indo-Pacific delivered by 
VADM Ray Griggs, Australia’s Chief of Navy.
 The report contains a summary record of the conference 
and concludes with the Chairman’s final statement from 
the conference. 
The conference program is provided at the end of this 
Special Report.  
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Opening address
Senator the Hon Bob Carr
Introduction 
The issues before this conference are important ones for 
Australia’s strategic policy. 
Australia has no deeper national interest than helping to 
ensure that the great success story of our century — the 
economic transformation of Asia in the Asian Century. 
And that means avoiding incidents and increases in tensions 
that can result in conflict, including in the South China Sea. 
For Australia and the region, the stakes couldn’t be higher. 
I congratulate the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on 
this initiative. 
I welcome all the distinguished speakers and guests. 
Together you represent the expertise and, I may say, the best 
aspirations of the nations of the East Asia Summit. 
In the keynote speaker who will follow me, Professor Hasjim 
Djalal from Indonesia, we have someone whose long-term 
interest and involvement in these issues is unsurpassed, 
notably through the Workshop Process on Managing 
Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, since 1990. 
A conference like this has a double importance and purpose. 
Significant in itself, it can become part of the process of the 
avoidance of conflict. 
The disputes arising in the South China Sea involve complex 
questions of history, territory claims, and competition for 
resources, national measures and international law. 
In our approach, the overriding needs are foresight, 
awareness, knowledge and understanding. 
In presenting paths along these lines, this conference can 
become part of the solution. 
I state Australia’s position at the outset: We do not take a 
position on any of the competing claims, but our interest in 
their peaceful settlement could hardly be more direct. 
We are a maritime nation as our very condition of 
our existence. 
More than 90 per cent of our merchandise trade goes and 
comes by sea. 
Two thirds of it moves across the South China and East 
China seas. 
Our continuing objective is to maintain and strengthen the 
peace and stability of the region based on international law. 
The Australian perspective today encompasses the most 
dynamic region in the world — the vast region of the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. 
The Indo-Pacific represents the centre of gravity of Australia’s 
economic and strategic interests. 
It includes nine of our top trading partners. 
By thinking in Indo-Pacific terms, we embrace our largest 
trading partner, China, our long established partnership with 
Japan, and our key strategic ally the United States, while 
reinforcing India’s role as a strategic partner for Australia. 
It brings in the big growth economies of South Korea and 
Vietnam, and the trade and diplomatic weight of ASEAN, with 
Indonesia at the centre. 
Thinking in Indo-Pacific terms benefits the world’s only 
nation surrounded by both these great oceans. 
Yet it has been a long time coming. 
When we remember our preoccupations of barely 40 years 
ago, the Indo-Pacific concept represents a revolution, and I 
believe, a liberation in our strategic thinking. 
We have come to mature terms with our place in Asia. 
So Australia has become familiar with the need for new ways 
of looking at the region and the world. 
Our capacity for new thinking has grown through the work of 
Australian organisations represented in this room. 
As well as this institute, we draw on the Australian National 
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at Wollongong 
University, the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre and 
the Australian Hydrographic Service. 
So, in matters of maritime governance, we are well 
equipped for new thinking, fresh approaches, better ways of 
anticipating and averting conflict. 
And for sharing ideas with the region. 
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But it is for the nations of the region themselves that we can 
best draw examples and explanations. 
The concept of joint development zones for fair and mutual 
development of resources, where territorial and maritime 
claims may overlap, flourishes in the region. 
The concept is provided in the United Nations Conventions 
on the law of the sea — ‘the Constitution for the Oceans’, as 
we see it. 
In our region, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have long been 
participants in joint development zones. 
Australia and Timor-Leste are also jointly developing Timor 
Sea petroleum resources. 
They are arrangements that have benefitted the 
countries involved. 
Directly relevant to South China Sea disputes, as Foreign 
Minister I’ve observed and encouraged the lead taken by 
ASEAN to develop with China a Code of Conduct for the 
handling and management of disputes. 
There is now an agreement between ASEAN and China to 
hold formal consultations on a code of conduct. 
This is something Australia welcomes. 
Consultation in itself can be part of the confidence building 
process by opening the dialogue and keeping it going. 
But we have also encouraged — and will continue to 
encourage — ASEAN countries and China to begin formal 
negotiations on a substantive code of conduct. 
Apart from the obvious benefits from a code of conduct, 
discussions on it can help clarify countries’ attitudes to 
confidence building measures (CBMs). 
As Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs paint in their paper 
Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in 
Indo-Pacific Asia (2011): 
‘A major obstacle to progress of effective maritime CBMs 
is the clash of views about the value and purpose of such 
instruments, particularly between the dominant strains 
of policy thinking in Beijing on one side and the United 
States, its allies and partners on the other.’ (pg4) 
Medcalf and Heinrichs note: 
‘The prevailing view in Beijing is that strategic “trust” 
should precede major advances in maritime diplomacy. 
In Washington and elsewhere the standard view is that 
CBMs are needed precisely when trust is absent.’ 
If this correctly states the crux of the problem, it seems to me 
to open an ample field for the endeavours of Australian and 
like-minded countries in ASEAN. 
For if the argument is to boil down, not so much to trust, but 
to the order of precedence of trust and compliance, which 
countries are better placed to help build both trust and 
confidence, hand in hand, step by step? 
Australia in particular, given the depth of our relationship 
with the United States, China and Japan. 
At the highest level of this issue, I believe that we can usefully 
apply the view I have often stated about the avoidance of 
conflict over specific, overlapping and competing territorial 
and maritime claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere: 
That to make progress, it can often be better for the parties 
directly involved to agree to disagree in advance. 
That instead of immovable positions on who owns 
what, rather to focus on how all parties can benefit from 
cooperative programs, confidence building measures and 
continuing dialogue. 
As I said before, the stakes couldn’t be higher. 
It’s true that the great danger is an irreversible crisis sparked 
by accident or miscalculation. 
We would have no excuse for sleep walking our way into 
unintended conflict. 
Let us make sure the story of spectacular growth and 
transformation of our region is not compromised by any 
prospect of newspaper headlines reporting conflict in the 
South China Sea. 
This is something that we all need to work at. 
We can make a modest contribution to this cause at 
this conference. 
 
About the speaker
Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Australia’s Minister for Foreign 
Affairs.
6 Special Report
Keynote address
Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal
I would like first of all to express my thanks for being 
invited to this conference. I think the conference is timely 
in view of the increasing problems in the South China Sea. I 
understand that the conference will be discussing functional 
cooperation related to, among other things, law enforcement 
activities, search and rescue operations, hydrographic 
surveys, humanitarian assistance, maritime safety, fisheries 
management, marine environmental protection, marine 
scientific research, and other subjects that may be related to 
these issues. I understand that we hope to be able to discuss 
possible procedures for avoiding and managing potential 
incidents that may take place between ships and aircraft of 
different countries.
Personally, I am very happy to come again to Australia, 
particularly to Sydney, to discuss issues that many of us have 
been confronted with in the past 20 or 30 years. I personally 
would hope that the participants, after being exposed to 
many ideas that may come up in this conference, will be able 
to contribute towards the development of peace, stability 
and cooperation in the South China Sea. 
I’m particularly happy and hopeful that the discussion will 
bring more light to the issues of military intelligence and 
activities within exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as far as 
they deal with the South China Sea. In fact, some of us who 
are participating in the present meeting have been very 
active and constructive in the past discussing these issues, 
and have formulated certain basic ideas.
Participants here at this Sydney conference—Sam Bateman, 
Mark Valencia and Admiral Akimoto—are among those who 
have previously contributed from time to time to the various 
meetings of the so-called ‘group of 21’ in Bali, Shanghai, 
Honolulu and Tokyo from 2002 to 2005. 
We worked under the basic assumption that the South China 
Sea, or some major portion of it, is under the EEZ regime. I 
would hope that those colleagues, including some experts 
from India, Russia and South Korea, will continue to be 
interested in developing practical ideas that could be further 
enriched, despite some of the sensitive issues involved.
With regard to other specific topics, such as search and 
rescue, hydrographic surveys, fisheries, maritime safety, 
marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, 
a lot of efforts to promote better understanding and 
cooperation on these issues have taken place within the 
series of workshops on managing potential conflicts in the 
South China Sea that have been organised by Indonesia since 
the 1990s.
In fact, we started with basic ideas on how to carry out 
activities that could be supported by the governments and 
authorities around the South China Sea. To recollect, at 
the second meeting in Bandung in 1991, we agreed on six 
basic principles:
1. Without prejudice to territorial and jurisdictional claims, 
to explore areas of cooperation in the South China Sea.
2. Such areas of cooperation include cooperation to 
promote the safety of navigation and communications, 
to coordinate search and rescue, to combat piracy and 
armed robbery, to promote the rational utilisation of 
living resources, to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, to conduct marine scientific research, and 
to eliminate illicit traffic in drugs in the South China Sea.
3. In areas where conflicting territorial claims exist, 
the relevant states may consider the possibility of 
undertaking cooperation for mutual benefit, including 
exchanges of information and joint developments.
4. Any territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the South 
China Sea area should be resolved by peaceful means 
through dialogue and negotiation.
5. Force should not be used to settle territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes.
6. The parties involved in such disputes are urged to 
exercise self-restraint in order not to complicate the 
situation.
In developing the idea, we divided the subject into six topics: 
political and security issues; territorial and jurisdictional 
issues; resources development issues; marine environmental 
protection issues; marine scientific research cooperation; 
and institutional mechanisms for cooperative efforts. 
Generally, we agreed to develop concrete cooperative 
programs, to encourage dialogue between the parties 
concerned who are involved in territorial and jurisdictional 
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issues, and to develop confidence processes and measures 
so that everyone will feel comfortable with one another. 
It took some 11 years for some of these ideas to be adopted 
in the declaration of conduct between members of ASEAN 
and China, signed in Phnom Penh in 2002. It took another 
10 years for ASEAN to struggle to develop the declaration of 
conduct to become a more legally binding code of conduct. 
Now, hopefully, China will be able to respond more positively 
to the idea, despite the fact that China does not seem to be 
in a hurry to conclude negotiations on the code of conduct 
with ASEAN. 
Once we have been able to conclude such a code of conduct, 
I believe many cooperative programs could be developed and 
implemented in the South China Sea. 
Finally, my experience in more than 20 years in managing 
potential conflicts in the South China Sea together with 
the ASEAN members, China and Chinese Taipei within 
the 1.5 track diplomacy indicates that China seems to be 
positive and willing to cooperate on technical, scientific 
and environmental issues. But it’s less enthusiastic about 
developing cooperation on resources distribution issues, and 
least interested in talking about territorial, sovereignty and 
jurisdictional issues. 
At this moment, we’re implementing a number of technical 
and scientific programs, such as biodiversity expeditions in 
the South China Sea, studies on sea-level rise as a result of 
climate change, Southeast Asian networking on training and 
education on maritime issues, and others.
I hope everyone will be supportive of our 1.5 track diplomacy. 
I hope that this conference will be productive and successful, 
including in developing some rules of engagement between 
law enforcement agencies as well as for military activities in 
the South China Sea area. 
 
About the speaker
Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal, MA is Senior Advisor to the 
Indonesian Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and 
Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff.
Background paper: Maritime confidence 
building measures—an overview
Dr Sam Bateman
This paper provides an overview of the nature and types 
of maritime confidence building measures (MCBMs) and 
notes the importance of effective regimes for managing the 
maritime domain. It covers maritime and naval cooperation, 
obligations to cooperate, maritime regime-building, and the 
law of the sea.
Confidence building measures (CBMs) and preventive 
diplomacy are widely discussed in security discourse. 
CBMs can be military measures or broader initiatives 
encompassing almost anything that builds confidence 
and promotes dialogue between countries. They include 
formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral, which contribute to a reduction in 
misperceptions and uncertainty.
Much discussion of these concepts draws on examples 
from the maritime domain. For example, many preventive 
diplomatic measures and CBMs identified in the concept 
paper tabled at the second meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in Brunei in August 1995 related to the maritime 
domain.1 The measures included zones of cooperation 
in areas such as the South China Sea, a cooperative 
regional maritime surveillance and safety regime, and the 
establishment of a marine information database.
The maritime domain
The maritime domain differs significantly from the terrestrial 
domain. Differences relate to the interrelationship of uses of 
the sea and the nature of maritime jurisdiction. Sovereignty 
at sea is invariably exercised with qualifications, whereas 
sovereignty on land is absolute. For example, sovereignty 
over the territorial sea is qualified by the right of innocent 
passage. In an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a coastal state 
only exercises sovereign rights over the living and non-living 
resources of the zone rather than full sovereignty. Maritime 
cooperation can be hindered by failure to acknowledge 
the interconnected nature of uses of the sea2 and the 
qualifications to the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction at sea.
In areas of overlapping jurisdiction, the maritime domain 
and its resources can’t be managed on the basis of 
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national jurisdiction alone. Cooperation in enclosed and 
semi-enclosed seas, such as the South China Sea, is an 
obligation of the littoral countries under Part IX of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Cooperation between neighbouring states is essential for 
good order at sea and effective maritime management. 
Nationalistic assertions of sovereignty and self-interest 
are obstacles to the effective management of the 
maritime domain.
It’s difficult for countries to take a truly independent 
national view of problems with using the sea. Fences can’t 
be established in the sea in the same way as on land. The sea 
is a common asset—and potentially a common enemy. It’s 
the fundamental medium of international commerce, but 
its problems follow no national boundaries. For example, 
freedom and safety of navigation, the prevention of marine 
pollution, the conservation of fish stocks, and the mitigation 
of maritime natural hazards (such as cyclones and tsunamis) 
are issues of concern to all coastal states. In implementing 
policies on these issues, countries should take into account 
the interests and rights of their neighbours, as well as those 
of other nations that legitimately send their ships into and 
through waters under some form of national sovereignty.
Maritime regimes
Common and conflicting interests in the maritime domain 
are addressed through the medium of maritime regimes. 
Regimes are required where no single decision-making 
entity holds exclusive power. It’s the nature of the maritime 
domain that the rights and duties of states invariably involve 
compromises if a ‘tragedy of the commons’ is to be avoided.
The interconnected nature of the maritime domain and uses 
of the sea mean that a careful balance is necessary between 
different uses of the sea, as well as between the interests of 
different parties. This is true both of the high seas and the 
roughly one-third of the world’s oceans that’s now enclosed 
as EEZs.
The EEZ regime reflects a careful balance between the 
rights and duties of coastal states and those of user states. 
Article 56(2) of UNCLOS provides that a coastal state should 
have ‘due regard’ to the rights and duties of other states in 
its EEZ. UNCLOS Article 58(3) requires other states to have 
‘due regard’ to the rights and duties of the coastal state in 
exercising their rights and duties in the EEZ. However, no 
guidance is provided on what constitutes ‘due regard’.
UNCLOS is an international regime, but there are a host 
of other maritime regimes for shipping, fishing, seabed 
mining, marine environmental protection, sea dumping, the 
prevention of ship-sourced pollution, search and rescue, 
and so on. Contemporary users of the seas face a variety 
of complex rules, norms, principles and decision-making 
procedures, which when put together in a particular issue 
area (such as maritime security, fisheries management or 
maritime safety) form an international regime.
International regulation of the maritime domain and its uses 
has increased significantly in recent decades. Many of the 
new international instruments underpinning the increased 
regulation of the maritime domain place a premium on 
cooperation. International maritime-related treaties 
requiring cooperation include the International Convention 
on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
(1990), the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) and the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (2003).
Maritime confidence building
The maritime domain is potentially a rich source of ideas and 
initiatives for confidence building. Just as security may be 
defined narrowly in military terms, or more comprehensively 
to incorporate human, economic, social and environmental 
security, maritime confidence building may also be 
defined either:
•	 broadly to include oceans management regimes and 
cooperative arrangements for navigation, safety, search 
and rescue, resources, marine environmental protection 
and so on, or
•	 narrowly to mean measures in the defence/military 
field that reduce the risks of tensions and conflict, and 
of misunderstanding or miscalculation with military 
activities at sea.
We can therefore distinguish between military and 
non-military MCBMs. Those of a non-military nature are 
mainly about building regimes and cooperation to provide 
good order at sea.
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Military MCBMs
MCBMs related to traditional security can take many forms. 
They can apply multilaterally or bilaterally and at the global, 
regional or subregional level. They relate primarily to the 
activities of military forces and can be relatively simple, 
such as ship visits and personnel exchanges, or relatively 
complex, such as regimes for cooperative surveillance or 
information exchange.
They can have a political focus, such as making the good 
intentions of a country more apparent (‘transparent’) and 
agreeing not to conduct certain types of maritime operation 
in a particular area or not to acquire certain technologies of 
maritime warfare. Or they might have an operational focus, 
such as the exchange of maritime surveillance information, 
the provision of prior notification of particular naval activities 
(such as exercises), or agreements to prevent incidents 
between naval forces (INCSEA agreements).
Naval transparency measures are largely subsumed 
within the wide variety of military transparency measures. 
They include invitations to observe naval exercises, 
military-to-military contacts, doctrine/defence planning 
seminars, greater openness regarding planning and 
procurement, and the preparation of defence policy papers 
(‘white papers’).
A distinction may be made between naval cooperation, which 
encompasses all military activities associated with the sea 
(recognising that in some countries maritime aircraft are 
operated by the air force), and maritime cooperation, which is 
a broader concept in line with the theory of comprehensive 
security and encompassing the full range of activities and 
interests in the sea (such as shipping, marine resource 
management and environmental protection).
Military MCBMs can be divided into three categories:
•	 declaratory measures—statements of intent, including 
broad commitments such as non-attack or no-first-use 
agreements
•	 transparency measures—including information, 
communication, notification and observation/inspection 
measures
•	 constraint measures—including risk reduction regimes 
and exclusion/separation zones, as well as more 
traditional constraints on personnel, equipment and 
operational activities.
INCSEA agreements
The 1972 agreement between the US and the Soviet Union to 
prevent incidents on and over the high seas is a key example 
of a practical MCBM that’s stood the test of lengthy and 
demanding operational experience.3 The agreement laid out 
a number of measures to prevent naval collisions and to limit 
provocative manoeuvring and signalling.
Bilateral INCSEA agreements were also negotiated between 
the Soviet Union and several Western European navies. 
Russia has also signed INCSEA agreements with Japan and 
South Korea.
In January 2001, the navies of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed 
on the MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incident Cooperative 
Guidelines, which provide standard safety procedures to 
apply during unscheduled encounters at sea between units 
of the two navies. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium has 
also agreed on the Code for Unalerted Encounters between 
Ships, which has some of the qualities of a non-binding 
multilateral INCSEA agreement.
The INCSEA agreements between the Soviet Union and 
Western navies aren’t necessarily good models for use 
elsewhere. First, they relate to the activities of navies that 
routinely conducted close surveillance of each other’s 
exercises and operations.
Second, the agreements are limited to high seas activities 
and not to EEZs or territorial seas. Any attempt to develop an 
agreement to apply in EEZs would open up the controversial 
question of the nature of the military activities that another 
state may conduct in the EEZ of a coastal state.
Third, their success can be attributed partly to the fact that 
they are all bilateral. Not only would the negotiation of 
multilateral agreements be difficult, but the investigation of 
particular incidents that possibly contravened an agreement 
would become more complicated if third parties had to 
be consulted.
Lastly, submerged submarine operations are excluded from 
these agreements.
Non-military MCBMs
Non-military MCBMs serve two purposes. First, they provide 
a direct benefit by helping to build maritime regimes that 
provide good order at sea and permit effective management 
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of the maritime domain. Second, they serve as ‘building 
blocks’ for habits of cooperation and dialogue that reduce 
tensions and promote peace and stability.
Good order at sea ensures the safety and security of shipping 
and permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and 
develop their marine resources in an ecologically sustainable 
and peaceful manner in accordance with international law. A 
lack of good order at sea is evident if there is illegal activity at 
sea or inadequate arrangements for the safety and security 
of shipping.
An effective regime for good order at sea involves several 
elements. First, it means the absence of illegal activity at 
sea through the suppression of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships; illegal fishing; illicit trafficking in drugs, 
arms, people or weapons of mass destruction; and illegal 
ship-sourced pollution.
The incidence of piracy, particularly the hijacking of ships 
and their cargoes, as well as other illegal activities at 
sea, suggests the importance of cooperation to preserve 
good order at sea. Agreed procedures for cooperative 
law enforcement between neighbouring countries, the 
harmonisation of maritime laws and the exchange of 
information are all possibilities.
Second, it requires arrangements for the safety and security 
of shipping. Requirements include the availability of effective 
search and rescue (SAR) services, good hydrographic surveys, 
reliable meteorological forecasts, and the provision of 
necessary navigational aids. One requirement for security is a 
system that provides a response to an emergency on board a 
ship (such as a pirate or terrorist attack) notified through the 
ship security alert system introduced with the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
Effective environmental and resource management is the 
third element of good order at sea. Under the provisions of 
UNCLOS, this is primarily the responsibility of the coastal 
state in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations in its 
EEZ. However, in areas such as the South China Sea where 
maritime boundaries haven’t been agreed and there are 
overlapping EEZ claims, management becomes problematic. 
As has been noted, cooperation is also a specific and joint 
responsibility of countries adjacent to an enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea under the regime in UNCLOS Part IX.
Specific tasks required for marine environmental protection 
and resource management include monitoring and 
prevention of ship-sourced marine pollution; mitigation of 
the effects of major oil spills, or other hazardous or noxious 
substances; the reversal of the degradation of marine 
habitats; the control of illegal, unreported or unregulated 
(IUU) fishing; and the establishment as required of marine 
protected areas and marine parks.
Finally and most basically, good order at sea means that 
nations are able to pursue their legitimate maritime interests 
in accordance with agreed principles of international law. 
However, this is another problematic area due to certain 
ambiguities in relevant regimes under the international law 
of the sea.
Cooperation between neighbouring states to maintain 
good order at sea is essential even in the absence of 
agreed maritime boundaries. It might be achieved through 
memorandums of understanding between the neighbouring 
states dealing with particular issues.
Problems arise if countries fail to ratify or adequately 
implement relevant international treaties. While these 
regimes have been developed at the global level, they 
depend fundamentally on implementation at the regional 
and national levels, and it is at those levels that the 
problems lie.
Law of the sea
UNCLOS is a significant MCBM in its own right. The fact that 
most East Asian countries, with the exception of Cambodia 
and North Korea, are parties to the convention gives grounds 
for confidence that effective management regimes for the 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas of East Asia will eventually 
be achieved. Cooperation between states is a common 
theme throughout UNCLOS, particularly in Part IX (on 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas), Part XII (relating to the 
preservation and protection of the marine environment), and 
Part XIII (dealing with marine scientific research).
Many provisions of UNCLOS have confidence building effects. 
For example, the innocent passage regime in Section 3 of the 
convention places specific restrictions on warships exercising 
the right of innocent passage, including a requirement that 
submarines should transit on the surface. UNCLOS prescribes 
procedures for the settlement of maritime disputes 
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The dimensions of maritime cooperation
Naval or military cooperation is a subset of maritime 
cooperation. Maritime cooperation encompasses any 
cooperative activity associated with an interest in the sea, 
the protection of the marine environment or a use of the sea 
or its resources. Table 1 shows the full dimensions of civil 
maritime cooperation and naval cooperation. It includes, in 
the middle column, the possible areas of joint activity that 
involve both military and civil agencies, such as surveillance, 
marine scientific research, SAR and law enforcement at sea. 
These may be performed jointly by the navy and civilian 
agencies, or in some countries may be entirely a naval or 
civil responsibility.
Law enforcement at sea
Law enforcement at sea can be either a civil or a military 
responsibility. Some countries have separate paramilitary 
maritime security forces (coastguards or marine police) for 
law enforcement at sea, while in other countries maritime law 
enforcement remains a naval responsibility.
The paramilitary forces undertake policing at sea akin to 
civil policing onshore. Cooperation between such forces 
offers benefits not available from naval cooperation. Their 
vessels are less intimidating and in periods of tension are 
less provocative. Tensions are evident with regard to the 
by peaceful means, and by clarifying the principles for 
delimiting maritime boundaries between adjacent states and 
establishing the EEZ regime it reduces risks of conflict arising 
from disputes over claims to offshore areas.
Effective maritime regimes require adherence to the 
legal principles of UNCLOS, as well as to other relevant 
international maritime treaties. However, there are still many 
‘grey areas’ in the Law of the Sea that require negotiation 
between interested parties. This is particularly so with 
provisions relating to the EEZ regime.
Some dialogue towards a common regional understanding of 
aspects of the Law of the Sea where uncertainty exists could 
be a worthwhile MCBM. The precedent for this activity would 
be the agreement between the US and the Soviet Union on a 
common interpretation of the regime of innocent passage.4 
This provides inter alia that neither prior notification nor 
authorisation is required for the passage of warships, 
regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion.
However, there’s also concern that some MCBMs could 
constitute a form of ‘creeping’ and ‘thickening’ jurisdiction 
that would have the overall effect of increasing coastal state 
control over adjacent waters beyond that allowed under 
international law and restricting the rights of foreign vessels 
to operate in those waters.
Table 1:  The dimensions of maritime cooperation
Naval/military cooperation Either or both Civil maritime cooperation
Ship visits
Personnel exchanges
Navy-to-Navy talks
Exercises
Joint doctrine development
INCSEA agreements
Transparency/prior notification of exercises & 
operations
‘Hotlines’
Standing forces
Mine countermeasures
Peacekeeping operations
Protection of shipping
Water space management for submarine 
operations
Counterpiracy
Counterterrorism
Law of the Sea
Marine safety
Marine technology development and transfer
Marine scientific research
Hydrographic surveys
Search and rescue
Humanitarian assistance / disaster relief
Marine databases
Information exchange
Education & training
Maritime surveillance
Law and order
Sovereignty/resource protection
Regional seas programs
Resource management (living & non-living)
Shipping & ports
Port state control
Coastal zone management
Environment protection
Joint development zones
Control of ship- and land-sourced pollution
Ecologically sustainable development
Marine ecosystem management
Marine tourism
Marine protected areas
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It’s easy to identify and talk about MCBMs; it’s much harder 
to translate them into a plan for action. The objective with 
MCBMs is a security environment in which countries don’t 
feel the need to build up their maritime forces, thereby 
creating a security dilemma for their neighbours or potential 
adversaries. Thus, when the navies become involved in the 
confidence building process, they’re effectively ‘working 
themselves out of a job’!
Notes
1  The concept paper is available on the ARF website at http://
aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Terms%20
of%20References%20and%20Concept%20Papers/
Concept%20Paper%20of%20ARF.pdf.
2  The preamble to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea notes that state parties to the convention are ‘Conscious 
that the problems of ocean space are closely inter-related 
and need to be considered as a whole’.
3  Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the 
High Seas, US–USSR, 25 May 1972, 23 UST 1168; Protocol to 
the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over 
the High Seas, 22 May 1973, 24 UST 1063.
4  Uniform Interpretation (by the United States and the Soviet 
Union) of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, 
agreement signed 22 September 1989. 28ILM1444.
5  Sarah Raine, Christian Le Miere (2013), Regional disorder: the 
South China Sea disputes, Adelphi series, 53:200.
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latent, and sometimes not so latent, suspicions held by some 
countries about the naval capabilities and intentions of 
their neighbours.
Law enforcement cooperation between paramilitary forces 
in areas of overlapping or disputed jurisdiction may be 
more feasible and offer greater benefits for security than 
cooperation between navies. This cooperation might extend 
to other requirements, including SAR and the prevention and 
mitigation of marine pollution.
As a recent paper from the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies noted:
Any moves towards more collaborative cooperation 
between assorted national paramilitaries—for 
example with regard to the protection of the marine 
environment or on counterpiracy or search and rescue 
missions—will offer more positive indications regarding 
prospective stability.5
Cooperation and confidence
The importance of cooperation to manage the maritime 
domain and its resources can’t be overstated. This is 
particularly the case where the EEZ or territorial sea of one 
country abuts onto those of another. If boundaries can’t 
be agreed, then arrangements for the joint management 
of common interests are required. Those arrangements 
would be in accordance with UNCLOS Article 74(3), which 
provides that, pending agreement on boundaries between 
adjacent EEZs:
the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding 
and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, 
during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement.
Unfortunately, however, a lack of trust may exist between 
neighbouring countries with unresolved sovereignty 
disputes. This will prevent cooperation if it’s argued that 
cooperation isn’t possible without confidence and trust 
between the parties to the dispute. It’s the contention of 
this paper that the opposite relationship applies—maritime 
cooperation is an MCBM that helps build the necessary trust 
and confidence. Cooperation should proceed even as the 
disagreements are negotiated at the political level and the 
sovereignty disputes remain unresolved.
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a. marine environmental protection
b. marine scientific research
c. safety of navigation and communication at sea
d. search and rescue operations
e. combating national crime, including, but not limited  
 to, trafficking in illegal drugs, piracy and armed  
 robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.2
The DOC commits parties to peaceful modes of dispute 
settlement, the application of international law, the need 
for building up confidence and trust, and recognition of 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the SCS. While 
it’s been successful in containing disputes and tensions in 
the SCS until recently, it hasn’t contributed to cooperative 
activities in the way that was hoped, or led to appropriate 
maritime confidence building measures (MCBMs).
In July 2011, China and ASEAN agreed on guidelines for 
developing a code of conduct between the claimant countries 
in the SCS.3 However, the guidelines don’t refer specifically 
to cooperation for management of the sea but rather identify 
confidence building measures as the initial activities to be 
undertaken under the DOC.
The focus in the SCS has shifted from cooperation to 
sovereignty and dispute resolution. Confidence building 
is now seen as a prerequisite of cooperation, rather than 
cooperation being viewed as a confidence building measure. 
The current emphasis is on resolving the sovereignty disputes 
and establishing a code of conduct rather than on building a 
cooperative management regime for the sea.
The demands for effective cooperative management 
regimes in the SCS will become more pressing in the future. 
Volumes of shipping traffic will continue to increase, bringing 
greater risks of ship-sourced marine pollution and shipping 
accidents. There’ll be increased pressure on the living and 
non-living resources of the SCS, as well as growing concern 
for the protection and preservation of the sea’s sensitive 
ecosystems and marine biodiversity.
Recent developments
The 20th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held in Brunei in July 
2013, noted the ASEAN Statement on the Six-Point Principles 
on the South China Sea as agreed by ASEAN foreign ministers 
Background paper: Existing and previous 
maritime cooperative arrangements in 
the South China Sea
Dr Sam Bateman
This paper provides a summary of existing bilateral and 
multilateral maritime cooperative arrangements in the 
South China Sea (SCS). These include arrangements for 
law enforcement, countering piracy, search and rescue 
(SAR), fisheries management, naval cooperation and 
marine environmental protection. The paper also refers 
to some past initiatives that have failed to achieve their 
intended outcomes.
The principal challenge in the SCS is to build a stable 
maritime regime that provides for good order at sea, eases 
tensions and reduces the risk of conflict. The countries 
around the SCS have a long history of confrontation with 
relatively few examples of successful cooperation. This is 
despite the obligation of countries bordering such a body of 
water to cooperate in accordance with Part IX of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which all the 
littoral countries are parties.
Obligations to cooperate
The SCS is a ‘semi-enclosed sea’ covered by Part IX of 
UNCLOS. The use of the words ‘should co-operate’ and 
‘shall endeavour’ in Article 123 of UNCLOS places a strong 
obligation on littoral states to coordinate their activities as 
defined in the subparagraphs of that article. While resource 
management, the protection of the marine environment and 
marine scientific research are mentioned specifically as areas 
for cooperation, the opening sentence of Article 123 creates 
a more general obligation to cooperate. That responsibility 
might be interpreted as including security and safety, 
including the maintenance of law and order at sea.1
The non-binding 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC) agreed between China and 
ASEAN also invites the littoral countries to cooperate on 
the following transboundary marine activities pending a 
comprehensive and durable settlement of the dispute:
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This offer was renewed in August 2012 when Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Fu Ying said that China was ready to promote 
maritime connectivity with ASEAN. China also renewed this 
offer of funding at the third ASEAN Maritime Forum held in 
Manila on 4–5 October 2012.
Despite considerable discussion of procedures for 
implementing the fund and the importance of cooperation, 
the priority for ASEAN remains an agreed code of conduct. 
There’s also some reluctance to concede leadership 
on the process of cooperation to China and a fear that 
cooperation under the fund may prejudice sovereignty 
claims. The claimant states have, however, agreed to 
establish four expert committees on marine scientific 
research, environmental protection, search and rescue, and 
transnational crime.5
The South China Sea Workshop process
Since 1990, Indonesia has hosted the series of Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the SCS. The main goal of the 
workshops wasn’t to solve the sovereignty disputes in the 
SCS but to develop a sense of ‘community’ in the SCS area 
that reflected the spirit of cooperation in UNCLOS, especially 
in the EEZ regime (articles 61–67) and the semi-enclosed seas 
concept in Part IX.6
In addition to annual workshops, the process included 
upwards of 25 technical working groups and groups 
of experts meetings on marine scientific research; 
marine environmental protection; safety of navigation, 
transportation and communication; resource assessment 
and means of development; and legal matters. The process 
achieved agreement for cooperative initiatives in a range 
of areas7, but due to lack of funding there’s been little 
follow-through on these initiatives and the workshop process 
has slowed down.
Cooperative activities
The principal areas for cooperation are transboundary 
issues that can’t be managed by one country acting alone. 
They include, for example, arrangements for the safety and 
security of growing shipping traffic; fisheries management; 
piracy and terrorist threats; and environmental threats, 
including pollution and the destruction of marine habitats.
at their meeting in Cambodia in July 2012.4 The principles 
include the commitment of ASEAN member states to the 
peaceful settlement of the disputes, full implementation 
of the DOC and its guidelines, and the early conclusion of a 
regional code of conduct in the SCS. The foreign ministers 
also resolved to intensify ASEAN consultations in the 
advancement of the principles, consistent with the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) and the 
ASEAN Charter (2008).
The ASEAN–China Joint Working Group to implement the 
DOC Guidelines will meet next in China in September 2013. 
China has also proposed an eminent persons group to 
discuss SCS issues.
Regional maritime security cooperation is under active 
consideration in three Track 1 forums:
•	 The ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security 
held its most recent meeting in April 2013. The current 
ARF Work Plan for Maritime Security includes three 
priority areas: information/intelligence exchange and 
sharing of best practice; confidence building measures 
based on international and regional legal arrangements 
and cooperation; and capacity building for maritime 
law enforcement.
•	 The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) 
Expert Working Group on Maritime Security held its 
most recent meeting in May 2013. The group conducted 
the ASEAN Maritime Security Information Sharing 
Exercise, involving regional navies, and will conduct the 
Maritime Security Field Training Exercise off Sydney in 
September 2013.
•	 The third ASEAN Maritime Forum and the first Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum were held in Manila in October 
2013 on the theme of ‘Strengthening maritime 
cooperation in the ASEAN region’.
At the Track 2 level, the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific’s Study Group on Maritime Security held its 
first meeting in Singapore in June 2013.
ASEAN–China Maritime Cooperation Fund
At the 14th ASEAN–China Summit in November 2011, China 
proposed setting up the ASEAN–China Maritime Cooperation 
Fund of RMB3 billion (about US$470 million) to implement 
practical projects under the implementation of the DOC. 
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and Central Pacific.8 China, the Philippines and Vietnam 
are parties to the convention, while Chinese Taipei is a 
participating fishing entity. The convention theoretically 
covers the SCS but it deals only with the conservation and 
management of highly migratory species that migrate into or 
out of the region. However, due to difficulties in negotiating 
the convention, the western boundary of the convention area 
is undefined, and only China, the Philippines and Vietnam are 
parties to the convention.
The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible 
Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the 
Region was agreed between Indonesia, Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam 
in 2007. Its objective is to enhance and strengthen the 
overall level of fisheries management in the region in order 
to sustain fisheries resources and the marine environment 
and to optimise the benefit of adopting responsible fishing 
practices. The actions cover the conservation of fisheries 
resources and their environment, managing fishing capacity, 
and combating IUU fishing in the SCS, the Sulu–Sulawesi seas 
(Celebes Sea) and the Arafura–Timor seas.
The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center is another 
forum concerned with fisheries management in Southeast 
Asia. Its membership comprises all Southeast Asian countries 
plus Japan, but not China. The centre’s mandate is:
to develop and manage the fisheries potential of the 
region by rational utilization of the resources for providing 
food security and safety to the people and alleviating 
poverty through transfer of new technologies, research 
and information dissemination activities.
APEC also assumed a role in regional fisheries cooperation 
with the establishment of its Fisheries Working Group and 
Marine Resource Conservation Working Group. The two 
groups merged in 2011 to form the Ocean and Fisheries 
Working Group. The recent focus of this group has been on 
IUU fishing and the sustainable development of aquaculture.
Non-living resources and joint development
Southeast Asia, including the SCS, is the most active area 
in the world for fixed offshore oil and gas platform projects, 
and floating platforms are also being facilitated by rapid 
technological developments. The ‘oil factor’ has also become 
an important element underpinning sovereignty assertions. 
Resource management
Fisheries
Fisheries management should be a common interest of all 
SCS littoral countries. The SCS accounts for about one-tenth 
of the global fish catch. Most fish stocks are either shared 
stocks, such as scad and mackerel that migrate across the 
EEZs of more than one coastal state, or highly migratory 
species, especially tuna, whose migratory patterns 
sometimes cover a large area of the Pacific Ocean.
Obligations to work together on fisheries management in the 
SCS are generally not being observed, despite the existence 
of several regional arrangements theoretically providing 
for cooperation. As a consequence, fisheries are being 
exploited in an unsustainable manner and illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing is rife. Specific agreements 
for the SCS on the conservation of fish resources, catch 
limits and the protection of certain marine species need to 
be considered.
The geography of the SCS means that there are areas 
enclosed within the EEZ of one country that were habitually 
fished by fishers of another, and that some fish stocks 
exist in the EEZs of two or more littoral countries. UNCLOS 
Article 62(3) requires in the first instance that a coastal 
state, in promoting the optimum utilisation of fish stocks 
in its EEZ, should take into account the interests of another 
state whose fishers have habitually fished in the EEZ. 
UNCLOS Article 63(1) requires in the second instance that 
the states concerned should seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organisations, to agree 
upon measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the 
conservation and development of such stocks.
The 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks was introduced under UNCLOS at 
the global level to enhance the cooperative management 
of fisheries resources that span different areas. However, 
around the SCS, only Indonesia is a party to this agreement. 
China and the Philippines have both signed the agreement 
but not ratified it.
The Convention for the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean, which entered into force on 19 June 2004, 
implements the Fish Stocks Agreement in the Western 
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completion of demonstration projects in China, the 
Philippines and the Malacca Strait, the project evolved into 
Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas 
of East Asia (PEMSEA).12 All countries adjacent to the SCS 
are participants in PEMSEA. The focus of PEMSEA is to build 
partnerships within and among regional governments, as 
well as across public and private sectors.
COBSEA isn’t well supported, and PEMSEA has kept clear 
of projects in disputed areas. Attempts to implement the 
UNCLOS Part IX obligations haven’t achieved the desired 
outcomes in the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, and 
the experience so far with the action plan steered by 
COBSEA gives few grounds for optimism that successful 
outcomes will be achieved.13 These programs have tended 
to have a single-sector focus on pollution, whereas a more 
multisectoral approach to ocean and coastal management 
is required.
The littoral states have declared numerous marine protected 
areas around the SCS, but those areas are in undisputed 
coastal and inshore waters. A marine protected area for a 
large part of the disputed area in the SCS, involving the SCS 
claimant states as well as the other states whose vessels 
exploit the living resources of the sea, might be possible.14
Marine scientific research
Good knowledge of the marine environment is essential for 
the effective management of regional seas. It’s particularly 
important in the SCS due to the rich biodiversity of the 
sea, its complex bottom topography and its rich resources, 
the exploitation and good management of which require 
good science.
An example of cooperative marine scientific research was 
the Current Metering Experiment conducted as part of 
the ASEAN–Australia Regional Ocean Dynamics Project 
during the 1990s. This gathered information on the flow of 
water and transfer of heat between the Pacific and Indian 
oceans—the key to climate patterns in Southeast Asia and 
the Western Pacific.
Recent attempts to establish cooperation for marine 
scientific research in the SCS have come to nothing. The Joint 
Oceanographic and Marine Scientific Research Expedition in 
the South China Sea was initiated between the Philippines 
and Vietnam in 1994 but lapsed in 2007.15 The bilateral 
However, perceptions of a rich bonanza of oil and gas 
reserves in the SCS are probably not justified, particularly 
so in and around the Spratly Islands.9 Furthermore, most 
oil and gas resources of the SCS are closer to shore in 
undisputed waters.
The joint development of offshore oil and gas resources 
is regularly proposed. The main problem invariably lies in 
determining the actual area for development. Existing joint 
development agreements include ones between China 
and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and a recent agreement 
between China and Brunei.
Cooperation to ensure the safety and security of offshore 
oil and gas installations in the SCS is a possibility, but no 
arrangements are in place yet.10
Marine environmental protection
The SCS constitutes a large marine ecosystem. In addition 
to a large percentage of the world’s coral reef species and 
about 12% of the world’s mangroves, the SCS has extensive 
seagrass beds and critical marine habitats for other species.11 
Its fisheries have major economic, food security and cultural 
significance for its coastal communities.
The process of maritime cooperation for the protection 
of the marine environment of a semi-enclosed sea under 
UNCLOS Part IX is institutionalised in the UN Environment 
Programme’s Regional Seas Programme. In theory, this 
program provides a framework for cooperation on marine 
environmental management, including sustainable resource 
development, but in practice it’s only had marginal success. 
The full benefits of meaningful cooperation haven’t been 
realised, as they depend heavily on the political commitment 
of participating countries and the establishment of effective 
delivery mechanisms to manage action plans. An action plan 
has been adopted for the waters of Southeast Asia through 
the Coordinating Body for the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA).
Marine environmental protection cooperation in the SCS 
is included the UN Development Programme – Global 
Environment Facility – International Maritime Organization 
Regional Program on the Prevention and Management of 
Pollution in East Asian Seas. The goal was to help regional 
nations to prevent and manage marine pollution through 
technical assistance and monitoring and regional capacity 
building and coordination. Following the successful 
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Law enforcement
Piracy and armed robbery at sea
Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea still occur in and 
around the SCS. While only two attacks were reported in the 
sea during 2012 (down from 13 in 2011), attacks also occur in 
littoral ports and anchorages, especially in Vietnam, Borneo 
and the Philippines.17
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Asia–Pacific 
(ReCAAP) provides for regional cooperation to counter 
piracy and armed robbery at sea. It involves all ASEAN 
nations (except Indonesia and Malaysia) and eight other 
extraregional countries. It includes an information network 
and a cooperation regime that includes the SCS. Countries 
participate in ReCAAP mainly through their coastguards 
rather than their navies.
The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) network has contributed 
to the reduction of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in the Malacca Strait and is a potential model for the SCS. It 
comprises air surveillance flights under the Eyes in the Sky 
program and coordinated sea patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Singapore, as well as an Intelligence Exchange 
Group, the MSP Information System (MSP-IS) and standing 
operating procedures, all under the direction of a joint 
coordinating committee.
Information sharing
The Information Fusion Centre operated by the Singapore 
Navy provides for regional maritime information-sharing 
cooperation among regional navies and other agencies. It 
helps cue participating countries to take actions to respond 
early to potential threats and developing situations. At 
the heart of the Information Fusion Centre is the Regional 
Maritime Information Exchange System (ReMIX), which is 
an initiative of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to 
share maritime security-related information. There will be a 
reference database of more than 150,000 vessels, designed to 
flag suspicious vessels that warrant closer surveillance. The 
MSP-IS is an element of the ReMIX.
The Indonesia–Singapore Coordinated Patrol arrangement 
coordinates patrols in Singapore Strait. It includes SURPIC, a 
real-time surveillance picture of the strait.
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in certain 
areas in the SCS was signed by the national oil companies of 
China and the Philippines in 2004 but lapsed after its term 
of three years. The tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine 
Scientific Research in Certain Areas of the South China 
Sea was signed by the national oil companies of China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam in 2005, also for a term of three 
years, but failed to realise expectations.
The ARGOS system is a key element of the Global Ocean 
Observing System, which is the major international 
oceanographic system for monitoring the world’s oceans. 
ARGOS involves a global array of instruments placed at 
strategic points about every 300 kilometres to measure 
temperature, salinity and circulation in the upper 
2,000 metres of the sea. However, due to jurisdictional 
uncertainty, few instruments have been deployed in the SCS.
Shipping
Shipping is a major use of the marine environment but 
cooperation is required to enhance the commercial efficiency 
of shipping operations, maintain safety and reduce the 
impact of these operations on the marine environment. 
Cooperation is also necessary for the mitigation and 
prevention of ship-sourced pollution, including arrangements 
for responding to the major oil spills that may result from 
maritime accidents and monitoring oil spills in open waters 
from routine tank cleaning and ballasting operations. 
Anecdotal information suggests that these activities 
occur undetected in the SCS due to the lack of an effective 
coordinated monitoring system.
The Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
Control provides a regional system of cooperation in 
inspecting and surveying ships to verify their compliance with 
international safety standards.16 The ASEAN Plan of Action 
in Transportation supports the implementation of the Tokyo 
MOU with a project on the harmonisation of procedures 
for port state control, as well as other maritime transport 
initiatives encouraging ASEAN members to accede to relevant 
conventions. Other collaborative forums dealing with 
shipping issues in the region include the Asia–Pacific Heads 
of Maritime Safety Agencies Forum and the Association of 
Maritime Education and Training Institutions in Asia Pacific.
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Search and rescue
The 1979 SAR Convention has a relatively low level of 
acceptance in the region20, possibly because of the costs 
involved in establishing an SAR infrastructure and a 
reluctance to allow searching ships or aircraft of another 
country access to sovereign waters or territory.
Regional search and rescue exercises (Sarex) are conducted 
under an agreement between ASEAN countries. They have 
involved most ASEAN countries and have been aimed at 
ensuring that all regional SAR agencies are able to coordinate 
assistance during major emergencies. There are also various 
bilateral Sarex arrangements and exercises between ASEAN 
countries, such as Sarex Indopura between Singapore and 
Indonesia and Sarex Malbru between Malaysia and Brunei.
ASEAN and China have also talked about SAR cooperation, 
but so far this has been limited to ‘table top’ exercises. A 
workshop on strengthening ASEAN–China cooperation on 
SAR in the SCS was held in June 2013.
Singapore has accepted SAR responsibility for a large part of 
the SCS (Figure 1) and has promulgated the Singapore Plan 
for SAR Services and Passenger Ships. However, SAR region 
boundaries don’t accord with national maritime boundaries, 
and this (along with the lack of ratification of the SAR 
Convention by some littoral countries) suggests that there 
could still be problems in mounting a large-scale maritime 
SAR operation in the region, particularly in disputed waters.
Naval cooperation
Exercises
Exercises present several opportunities for confidence 
building, such as routinely providing prior notice of exercises 
(‘transparency’) and exchanging observers at national 
exercises. Tactical exercises based on exercising war-fighting 
skills and doctrine at sea may be too sensitive, but SAR, 
humanitarian assistance or disaster relief exercises involving 
regional navies should be encouraged.
Annual US-sponsored exercises in Southeast Asia, some 
of which take place in the SCS, include the Southeast 
Asian Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise, a major 
maritime exercise involving most regional countries, and the 
Cooperation Afloat, Readiness, and Training (CARAT) series 
of bilateral exercises between the US and most regional 
National maritime information systems are also being 
established. Indonesia is planning a multiagency 
National Maritime Information Centre, which will be 
under the Indonesian Navy. The Philippines’ National 
Coast Watch System is also being developed to provide 
interagency coordination and maritime security across the 
Philippines archipelago.
The National Coast Watch System builds on the Coast 
Watch South System established by the Philippines with the 
assistance of Australia and the US in the tri-border area in the 
Sulu and Celebes seas between Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. This had the potential to provide the basis of an 
integrated system of maritime security in the area involving 
the three coastal states, but the necessary protocols haven’t 
been agreed.18
Potential exists for greater coordination and cooperation 
between these various regional and national maritime 
information systems. ReCAAP provides this for piracy, but 
there’s a gap for other forms of illegal activity at sea. Any 
regional system must have a multiagency approach.
The ARF Regional Maritime Information Centre, having 
been proposed by China, was adopted by the eighth ARF 
in Hanoi in July 2001. A website was set up and managed 
by the National Marine Data and Information Service of 
China. An important aim of the ARF information centre is to 
share information and intelligence among ARF participants 
for better cooperation and coordination. The fifth ARF 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, held in Seoul 
in April 2013, suggested that the initiative be revived and 
further developed.19
Operational cooperation
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Parts of the SCS region are vulnerable to natural disasters, 
including earthquakes, storm surges, tsunamis and 
typhoons. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response, set up in 2005, promotes regional 
cooperation and collaboration in reducing disaster losses 
and intensifying joint emergency responses to disasters in 
the ASEAN region.
The ARF has established an Inter-Sessional Meeting on 
Disaster Relief. An ARF disaster relief exercise was held in 
Thailand in May 2013.
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There’s scope for regional cooperation on submarine training 
and safety, including submarine escape and rescue exercises, 
and the development of protocols to deal with missing or 
sunk submarines. Combined submarine rescue exercises 
have already been held in the SCS.
Avoiding incidents at sea
Agreed multilateral arrangements to prevent and manage 
incidents at sea between the maritime security forces 
of littoral countries don’t exist at present, although two 
models are available. The navies of Indonesia and Malaysia 
have agreed on the MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incident 
Cooperative Guidelines, which provide standard safety 
procedures to apply during unscheduled encounters at 
sea between units of the two navies. All littoral countries 
also participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 
which has agreed on the Code for Unalerted Encounters 
between Ships.
countries. The US and the Philippines have also conducted 
amphibious exercises in the SCS.
While exercises may constitute a military MCBM, they 
can also send the wrong message if they’re perceived as 
exercising against a particular threat or are conducted in a 
sensitive area.
Submarine safety
The proliferation of submarines in the SCS poses challenges 
for preventive diplomacy, maritime confidence building, 
and ensuring the safety of submarine operations. There are 
increased risks both of submarine accidents and of incidents 
resulting from the detection of a submarine in disputed 
waters. It may be necessary to consider the establishment of 
a regional submarine movement advisory authority (or water 
space management regime) along the lines of the procedures 
followed by Western navies, but this will be difficult in view of 
the essentially covert nature of submarine operations.
Figure 1:  Search and rescue region in Southeast Asia
  
Source: Admiralty Light and Radio Signals
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The evolution of confidence building 
measures
The term ‘confidence building measure’ is commonly 
understood to have originated during the Cold War, in the 
context of arms control. While this is accurate as far as the 
specific term is concerned, the notion of confidence or 
trust building between states has a much longer pedigree. 
The evolution of CBMs can be separated into three phases: 
pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War.
The long period from the Middle Ages to the Cold War 
is rich in measures designed to bring order to anarchy, 
particularly in the maritime domain. The year 1271 saw the 
establishment between King Edward I of England and Guy, 
Count of Flanders, of an agreement ‘as to the Behaviour at 
Sea of English and Flemish Ships’.3 In 1604, Hugo Grotius 
completed his seminal work, Mare Liberum, thus sparking 
the pursuit of freedom of the seas which endures today. The 
1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea, as amended, are founded on mid-19th century 
collision prevention procedures regulated by Trinity House 
of Montreal.4
The Washington Conference is familiar as a form of naval 
arms control during the interwar period. US President 
Harding’s invitation to the event is instructive:
It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final 
assurance of peace of the world in the absence of the 
desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments 
is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in 
a practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding 
and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and 
their application.5 (emphasis added)
One manifestation of such a practical effort to remove 
misunderstanding can be seen in the 1963 establishment 
of a hotline between the US and the Soviet Union. Still, this 
predated the term ‘confidence building measure’, which did 
not emerge until included in treaties of the early 1970s, linked 
to nuclear arms control.6
Those treaties provided impetus for the UN General 
Assembly, at its 34th session in 1979, to request of the 
Secretary-General that a comprehensive study on CBMs 
be undertaken and reported at the 36th session in 1981.7 
Although the report was crafted in the context of confidence 
building designed to facilitate disarmament negotiations, 
Background paper: A naval perspective of 
maritime confidence building measures
Captain Justin Jones
Thus, the Navy has always been an instrument of the 
policy of States, an important aid to diplomacy in 
peacetime.   —Sergei Gorshkov1
On 4 March 2006, six boghammers (fast patrol boats) 
from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) 
detached from a sunken crane which lies at the head of 
the North Arabian Gulf, just inside the Iranian side of the 
adjoining Iraqi territorial waters. The sunken crane was a 
well-known observation and staging post for the Iranian 
Navy and IRGCN, and was under continual surveillance by 
coalition forces belonging to Task Force 58. The boghammers 
split into three groups, increased speed to maximum, and 
executed a coordinated, multi-axis converging manoeuvre 
towards Iraqi territorial waters and the Kwar Abd Allah Oil 
Terminal (KAAOT) which is located close to the maritime 
border. The KAAOT guard ship, HMAS Parramatta, responded 
immediately by increasing speed and conducting a series 
of sweeps designed to protect the oil terminal. The tense 
situation was able to be de-escalated.
In an incident two days earlier, an IRGCN boghammer had 
crossed into Iraqi territorial waters and headed towards 
KAAOT. HMAS Parramatta had blocked the path of the vessel 
and the two commanding officers had a short conversation 
in broken English. During the courteous exchange, the 
Australian captain was able to make clear that his ship 
was there to guard the exclusion zone surrounding the oil 
terminal.2 The brief interaction ended with the handover of a 
small gift from the Australian.
Might the earlier, short yet professional exchange have 
contributed to the de-escalation of the more concerning 
incident? If so, does the example of interaction between 
commanding officers constitute a form of confidence building 
measure (CBM)? This background paper is designed to 
provoke thought regarding these questions by providing an 
overview of maritime confidence building measures (MCBMs) 
and offering a potential framework for their application. 
In order to lay the groundwork, it’s useful to begin with a 
historical appreciation of the development of the term.
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Given the outcomes sought, and for the purposes of this 
paper, CBMs can be defined succinctly using the words of 
President Harding: practical efforts to remove the causes of 
misunderstanding. Maritime CBMs, specifically, are those 
that occur in the maritime environment.16
A framework for analysis
Having defined the meaning of MCBM in the context of this 
paper, a framework for their application can be considered. 
That is, what might realistically be realised from MCBMs?
There’s a natural limit to the extent of MCBMs between 
non-allied nations, influenced by the aforementioned 
historical experiences and geographical, strategic, political 
and other factors. However, coastal states17 in particular 
share a key interest—the safety and security of shipping on 
the global commons. National economies depend heavily 
on maritime trade. This convergence of national interests 
provides fertile ground for exploitation. It also means that 
MCBMs don’t necessarily have to occur between navies and/
or militaries alone.
Cooperation should be able to be achieved without trust 
where national interests converge. This is a typically Western 
view. Chinese, for example, tend to espouse the development 
of trust before MCBMs can occur.18 In the Western ideal, this 
is a paradox. The purpose of MCBMs, as the name suggests, is 
to build trust.
A framework for understanding MCBM architecture 
can be underpinned by institutions, individuals and 
interdependence. Broadly, this refers to the organisations 
that are involved, the individuals or delegations that 
participate and the processes, or measures, adopted.
Institutions
The Indo-Pacific security architecture is a cluttered one. 
A plethora of regional, supraregional and subregional 
organisations exists already. Official, or Track 1, bodies 
within the Indo-Pacific include ASEAN, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, 
the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Indian Ocean Rim Association 
for Regional Cooperation, and the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium—the latter modelled on the WPNS. There’s no 
overarching organisation within the wider region, and little 
appetite to establish one.
there are many aspects of its contents which remain 
relevant today. Close inspection shows a tacit broadening 
of the concept of CBMs, embodied in the assertion that 
‘international confidence cannot be achieved through the 
building of military confidence alone.’8
The demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War during 
the 1989–1991 period precipitated what might be seen as the 
third phase in the evolution of CBMs. This phase involved not 
only a definitive widening in the scope of CBMs beyond pure 
arms control, but also a shift in the centre of CBM architecture 
from Europe and the Atlantic to the Asia–Pacific, and the 
South China Sea in particular.9 With this latter phase of 
development in mind, it’s appropriate to define what’s meant 
by the term ‘maritime confidence building measures’.
Maritime confidence building measures 
defined
One of the challenges with MCBMs is a lack of consensus on 
what constitutes a CBM and what doesn’t. This challenge 
is influenced by the very perceptions of mistrust that CBMs 
seek to ameliorate, which originates from a complex web of 
historical experiences and geographical, strategic, political, 
economic, social and other elements.10 It’s helpful to turn 
first to the outcomes sought from CBMs.
While a considerable number of by-products, discussed 
below, will result from the conduct of CBMs, the primary 
outcomes sought tend to meet the following characteristics:
•	 the ‘cultivation of commonalities’11
•	 situation management12
•	 reducing misperception13
•	 mitigating escalation.14
These characteristics are to an extent embodied in the neat 
encapsulation of the UN, which identified the goal of CBMs as 
being to:
contribute to, reduce or, in some instances, even 
eliminate the causes for mistrust, fear, tensions and 
hostilities, all of which are significant factors in the 
continuation of the international arms build-up in 
various regions and, ultimately, also on a world-wide 
scale. A second goal is to reinforce confidence where it 
already exists.15
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direction from the outcomes of ministerial level 
talks. Deals with strategic level issues and delegates 
operational level matters to an operational working 
group.
•	 Operational working group (operational). Normally 
co-chaired at Captain/Commander level. This forum 
conducts detailed planning of initiatives agreed 
at the navy–navy level. The working group builds 
networks and develops MCBMs.
•	 Other working groups, such as communications and 
logistics. The form and extent of subordinate working 
groups will depend on the nature of the relationship 
between the two navies or militaries.
•	 Task groups and individual ships or units (tactical 
level). Execute the plan.
This basic framework is transferable across governmental 
and non-governmental agencies, less so with academic 
forums. When the framework is applied across the breadth 
of interactive activities occurring between states, the result 
is a panoply of activities with good intent, which may not 
be in alignment with each other. Herein lies a fundamental 
limitation to a whole-of-government approach to MCBMs. 
The scale of the endeavour invites a potential lack of synergy.
Notwithstanding, it’s important for states to ensure that 
there are a broad array of governmental, non-governmental 
and academic entities involved in MCBMs. The involvement 
of bureaucrats and/or politicians in confidence building 
activities may be constrained by domestic political 
considerations and diplomatic expectations. Many outcomes 
are shaped prior to actual meetings and general face-to-face 
discussion limited to a tight agenda manufactured by 
advisers. But real decision-making power resides at this level, 
so once bounds are set and agreed, authority needs to be 
driven down to practitioners to develop the detail and ensure 
follow-through.
These practitioners should include a broad range of maritime 
agencies: coastguards, navies, fisheries enforcement 
agencies and the shipping industry. The 2010 Senkaku 
Islands stand-off between China and Japan occurred 
between the Japan Coast Guard and commercial fishermen. 
The 2008 USNS Impeccable incident occurred between a 
non-commissioned US naval vessel and Chinese fisheries 
enforcement agency ships. These examples underscore the 
necessity to ensure broad maritime agency involvement in 
MCBM development.
Non-governmental, or Track 2, dialogues such as the Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) have an 
important contribution to make towards regional confidence 
building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, 
consultation and cooperation. In CSCAP’s case, the prime 
relationship is with the ARF. This affords useful academic 
input to the many forums which include the ARF as member. 
Realistically, though, the multitude of platforms in which 
MCBM development occurs complicates the effectiveness 
of outcomes. The Indo-Pacific lacks a synergistic approach 
to security.
An overarching regime that coordinates regional MCBMs is 
unrealistic due to the nature of the existing organisations. 
But it’s not an impossible notion as long as a convergence 
of national interests, in this case maritime security, exists. 
The existing architecture may provide a ‘multi track path 
to an East Asia Community’, as has been suggested.19 
Acknowledging a need for regional ‘buy-in’ is important. 
The ARF’s 27 members include Indian Ocean stakeholders 
such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In the fragile region 
of Northeast Asia, it also draws in North Korea. Whether 
an informal overarching CBM or MCBM regime evolves over 
time or a more formal architecture is established remains 
to be seen. In either case, the community of interested 
stakeholders is likely to increase.
Individuals
There exists a broad array of interaction throughout 
the Indo-Pacific. Forums range across governmental, 
bureaucratic, academic, military and non-governmental 
forms. Instruments include, inter alia, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative and the 
International Shipping and Port Security Code. It would prove 
difficult to streamline the activities that qualify as MCBM 
under one umbrella.
A regular structural form for naval and military interaction is 
as follows:
•	 Defence Minister meetings (grand strategic). 
Examples include the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus, Five Power Defence Arrangements 
Ministerial Meetings, Australia–US ministerial talks 
(AUSMIN), and various 2+2 forums.
•	 Navy–navy level (military strategic). Normally 
co-chaired at Rear Admiral/2 Star level. Draws 
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complement to the INTCOLREGS with naval and military ships 
and aircraft in mind. The Soviet–US INCSEA provided for:
•	 measures to avoid collision
•	 non-interference in formations of the other party
•	 avoidance of manoeuvres in areas of heavy shipping
•	 maintenance of safe distance between vessels
•	 the use of accepted signals when manoeuvring
•	 not simulating attacks, launching objects or 
illuminating the bridges of other party’s ships
•	 requiring aircraft to use caution and prudence when 
approaching or operating near ships and aircraft of 
the other party.21
The Soviet–US INCSEA also included an article relating to the 
provision of three to five days warning prior to major naval 
and military activities on the high seas. This is likely to be a 
point of potential disagreement between states, although the 
absence of such a provision shouldn’t significantly disrupt the 
central purpose of the agreement.
The Soviet–US INCSEA isn’t the only precedent for such 
agreements. The UK and Soviet Union signed their own 
INCSEA in 1986. Germany, Canada, France and Italy signed 
agreements with the Soviets in 1988 and 1989. Germany and 
Poland signed a similar arrangement in 1990. The striking of 
an INCSEA between China and the US, in particular, would 
make a powerful exemplar for other Indo-Pacific states. 
This isn’t to suggest that a multilateral agreement should 
be sought. However, building bilateral agreements first may 
initiate a natural evolution to multitrack processes.
Communications at sea
The international language of the sea is English, and standard 
protocols for communications between ships at sea already 
exist. These don’t take into account that standards of 
comprehension vary considerably, as do interpretations of 
international laws such as INTCOLREGS and the 1982 Law 
of the Sea Convention. The WPNS developed a publication 
known as Communications for Unalerted Encounters at Sea 
(CUES) for use among its members’ navies.22 This initiative 
should be discussed within the expanded Indo-Pacific 
maritime community. The advantage of a publication such 
as CUES is that it reduces the risk of miscommunication 
between naval and military vessels, which may arise as a 
Interdependencies
The definition of MCBM applied in this paper invites broad 
interpretation. An MCBM can range from a goodwill port 
visit by a warship to a major multilateral exercise between 
navies. In the non-military sphere, MCBMs might include 
coastguards exchanging expertise and experience, or federal 
police assisting to build capacity in developing countries. 
Where should states focus in this broad expanse between the 
innocuous and the aspirational?
A number of MCBMs can be seen as realistic and achievable 
initiatives. These are based on the premise of being 
practical efforts to remove the causes of misunderstanding, 
thereby reducing the risk of miscalculation during maritime 
encounters and/or incidents between states. Encounters 
such as the 2010 Senkaku and 2008 USNS Impeccable 
incidents will continue to occur, most particularly in the 
disputed maritime zones and busy shipping lanes of East Asia 
and the South China Sea.
If a preconceived set of measures is in place, then the risk 
of tactical level miscalculation resulting in strategic level 
misfortune may be reduced. These measures include:
•	 a new incidents at sea regime (INCSEA)
•	 a common means of communicating between naval 
vessels
•	 formal channels of communications between states 
(‘hotlines’)
•	 coordinated patrols.
INCSEA
The notion of an incidents at sea agreement is founded 
on the 1972 agreement between the Soviet Union and the 
US. The agreement was designed to prevent the frequent 
interactions at sea between military aircraft and naval 
vessels from becoming serious incidents.20 Importantly, 
an INCSEA isn’t predicated on influencing the size, force 
structure or weaponry of states party to the agreement. It’s a 
method of risk reduction.
There exists a comprehensive set of regulations pertaining 
to the conduct of vessels on the high seas and all waters 
connected therewith. These are known as the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
(INTCOLREGS), as amended. An INCSEA shouldn’t interfere 
with these rules in any way. It should be designed as a 
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were considered as those ‘more immediately related to 
contested zones, contentious issues and threatening 
capabilities’, whereas indirect MCBMs were considered 
to be ‘forms of engagement and cooperation that are 
geographically remote from or in other ways only indirectly 
related to the main issues, zones or capabilities of contention 
and concern.’27 Their menu of MCBMs therefore took the 
following form:
•	 Direct CBMs
–  channels of communication (hotlines)
–  standards for communication at sea (CUES)
–  declarations, non-binding codes
–  formal agreements (INCSEA)
–  operational-level dialogue
•	 Indirect CBMs
–  goodwill visits
–  bilateral dialogues / navy-to-navy talks / naval  
    staff talks
–  combined exercises
–  operational cooperation
–  agreements (e.g. submarine search and rescue)
–  educational exchanges
–  Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.28
From the range of potential MCBMs outlined in this paper, 
a number of by-products can be inferred: interoperability 
between navies and/or maritime agencies; regional capacity 
building; improved integration; continued engagement 
among regional navies; goodwill; technology transfer; 
continued dialogue; and access to the region. These all 
contribute, many in intangible ways, to reducing the potential 
for misunderstanding, improving relations and enhancing 
good order at sea.
Conclusion
Confidence building has a long history in international 
relations, predating Westphalian conceptions of the 
sovereign state. In the modern and post-modern eras, the 
notion of MCBMs has undergone an evolutionary process 
result of unequal language proficiency. It makes a useful 
accompaniment to an INCSEA.
Formal channels of communication between states
In 2010 China and Japan agreed in principle to establish 
a hotline as a means of direct communication between 
governments. The initiative was never followed through.23 
The US and China had previously established a similar 
hotline.24 In each case, the purpose of the communications 
channel was perceived differently. China has viewed the 
hotline as a method of providing forewarning of naval and 
military activities. Japan and the US perceive the hotline as a 
means of resolving concerns. The benefit of a hotline is direct 
communications between states, in order that the risk of 
misunderstanding concerning naval and military activities is 
reduced. There’s potentially significant value in the presence 
of direct lines of communication between governments. 
There are also risks. The purpose/s and limitations of the 
channel must be agreed and understood. Moreover, the 
identification of the end users—the government departments 
and individuals concerned—is fundamental.
Coordinated patrols
The conduct of coordinated patrols in areas of sensitivity is 
a useful means of building confidence, albeit a potentially 
controversial one. Again, precedents exist for such an 
initiative. One example is the coordinated patrols conducted 
by India and Thailand25 and India and Indonesia along the 
maritime boundaries of the Andaman and Nicobar islands.26 
The areas in which these patrols are performed straddle the 
important sea lanes of the Malacca Strait. This adds a degree 
of authenticity to what might otherwise be viewed as solely 
an MCBM.
The model is transferable to maritime boundaries in East 
Asia and the South China Sea. In particular, consensus on 
coordinated patrols might be achieved where the safety and 
security of joint offshore exploration assets is concerned. The 
contentious nature of this proposition should be recognised, 
but there’s potential for a confidence building benefit should 
states pursue the notion.
Types of MCBMs and their by-products
Writing in 2011, Medcalf, Heinrichs and Jones separated 
MCBMs into direct and non-direct measures. Direct MCBMs 
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which has been underpinned by two main developments. 
These are the gradual expansion of the concept from pure 
arms control measures to broader, whole-of-government 
approaches to trust building, coupled with a geographical 
shift in their main centre of use from Europe to Asia. At a 
minimalist level, MCBMs seek to cultivate commonalities, 
manage situations, reduce misperception, and mitigate 
escalation. Thus, MCBMs are considered as practical efforts 
to remove the causes of misunderstanding in the maritime 
domain. As a by-product, there’s a potential to realise 
improved relations and increase good order at sea.
This paper has proposed a framework for the understanding 
of MCBMs within the Indo-Pacific, namely institutions, 
individuals and interdependence. None of the measures 
outlined is expected to circumvent or replace the extant 
range of MCBMs already occurring throughout the region. 
Moreover, the concept of MCBMs shouldn’t be viewed as 
a panacea for the issues and challenges of intraregional 
relations, nor the ultimate solution to disputes, maritime or 
otherwise. The MCBMs expounded in this paper are simply 
an assessment of realistic and achievable measures that 
could be established between regional states, in this case 
using navies and maritime agencies as the appropriate tools 
of statecraft. In this respect, as Gorshkov suggested, navies 
and maritime agencies will continue to be important aids to 
diplomacy in peacetime.
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display of force to intimidate or deter me in a naval stand-off 
with you. 
There are two dimensions to trusting your declaration not to 
use force in any disagreement with me, or the reliability of the 
numbers in your Defence White Paper.
It means that I am prepared to take the risk of believing your 
declaration or readiness to comply with CBMs we agree 
upon, and that in the event of your not complying with your 
declaration or with the CBM, I’ve calculated that I have the 
capacity or resilience to absorb the consequences to my 
security and wellbeing of your breaking your declaration not 
to be the first to use force in a disagreement. Likewise, you 
will have to assess the risk to you of my not complying with 
the CBMs we agree to. What reasons or justifications do I have 
to trust you, and vice versa, especially when I’m not prepared 
to surrender my future wellbeing to the trustworthiness 
of your declaration? This is the quantitative and predictive 
dimension of trusting you to comply with CBMs we agree 
to. In the rational actor and realist world we live in, distrust 
becomes the default response to proposals for CBMs. 
However, if we are not to live in a perpetual and totally 
Hobbesian world of anarchy, then at some point in time and 
space I have to suspend my risk assessments of not trusting 
you and make a qualitative leap of faith to believe that both 
you and me have a normative and moral interest in not 
being the first to use force in any disagreement, and that 
mediation within some kind of institution or CBM should be 
the preferred option for the management, if not resolution, 
of our disagreement. The challenge for us is to cooperate and 
build confidence without trust. 
On this assumption of trust as the key to which CBMs are 
likely to take off and should be argued for, and which are 
likely to be stillborn, I suggest the following three-category 
classification of CBMs. 
The first category of CBMs is those that depend upon 
a rational actor quantification of risk in accepting and 
complying with the CBM. This category of CBMs would 
principally include declarations and non-binding codes of 
refraining from the use of force in a dispute and transparency 
about naval modernisation and build-ups in defence papers. 
The underlying issue with this category of CBMs is assurance 
of compliance with non-binding declarations or procedures 
for verification and monitoring of declarations of naval 
Conference paper: Trust and maritime 
confidence building measures
Mr Kwa Chong Guan
We have for the past two decades been preoccupied with 
confidence building measures (CBMs) as building blocks 
for peace and security in the Asia–Pacific. We adopted 
this strategy of CBMs as the underpinning of cooperative 
security in the Asia–Pacific from the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, which had inherited from its 
predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, a legacy of CBMs from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
regime to the Vienna Document regime since 1990. In Track 1 
and various Track 2 networks for the past two decades, we’ve 
proposed for the Asia–Pacific a large number of CBMs and 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and 
continue to do so. 
Proposing a variety of CBMs/CSBMs on the assumption 
that they have worked in transforming European security 
in the post-Cold War world is the easy part of the exercise. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum at its inception adopted a 
three-phrase development plan that starts with the adoption 
and practice of CBMs, which leads to preventive diplomacy 
and then moves to conflict management and resolution. 
But, two decades on, the ASEAN Regional Forum is still 
preoccupied with CBMs, and appears not yet ready to move 
into preventive diplomacy. This suggests that, while it’s easy 
to propose CBMs to build cooperative security, it’s more 
difficult to decide when CBMs are likely to succeed and which 
will be stillborn. 
I argue that trust decides whether CBMs will be adopted and 
practised. This raises the issue of whether CBMs precede 
and build trust, as many assume, or whether trust is a 
prerequisite for CBMs to succeed.
Trust is not an end state or product of CBMs, or a necessary 
beginning for CBMs, but an interactive process of building 
confidence, which is underpinned by trust. CBMs assume 
that, for example, I am prepared to put my future wellbeing 
into your hands when I trust your declaration not to be 
the first to use force in any disagreement I may have with 
you in future. Or that I trust that the numbers given in your 
Defence White Paper on your naval modernisation are 
true and reliable, and you’re not out to deceive me so that 
I’m surprised by the number and size of your frigates in a 
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are divided by very different risk assessments of the potential 
losses and gains to us. 
What, then, are the institutions (other than the UN and its 
Security Council) upon which we can build some form of 
cooperation without trust? If we look back to the European 
experience, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe operated in an environment where trust was in deficit 
and in the 1975 Helsinki regime managed to agree only to 
voluntary prior notification of major military manoeuvres 
(21 days for 25,000 troops) and voluntary exchanges of 
observers (with no assurance of reciprocity) and visits of 
military delegations.
In 1986 at Stockholm, annual calendars of planned notifiable 
activities and onsite verification in cases of doubts about 
compliance in reporting troop movements were adopted as 
new CBMs. After that, other CBMs (such as annual information 
on planned deployments, budgets and strengths of land 
and air forces) were added in a series of four agreements 
concluded in Vienna between 1990 and 1999. 
Transposing this European experience to the South China 
Sea, where there’s a similar deficit of trust among the 
interested parties, leads to the conclusion of the primacy of 
CBMs for prior notification of movements of naval forces and 
naval exercises and operations and some kind of ship visits 
and port calls.
But what is the South China Sea and wider Pacific Ocean 
equivalent of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe and its successor, to frame these CBMs to promote 
information exchange and maritime domain awareness? 
Earlier in the Cold War, the Soviet and US navies were 
sufficiently professional to be able to negotiate a series of 
procedures to avoid incidents at sea, despite their strategic 
differences and rivalry. Can we today promote similar navy-
to-navy dialogues and exchanges to cooperate without trust? 
Would the Western Pacific Naval Symposium be a suitable 
regime to build navy-to-navy dialogues and exchanges?
In the South China and East China seas today, the issue 
is not only a navy-to-navy standoff that needs to be 
prevented, but also stand-offs between a plethora of other 
law enforcement agencies protecting fishermen and other 
marine resources. There’s a growing need to provide for 
some form of confidence building and cooperation between 
the coastguards many littoral states have established. We 
build-ups and deployments. What’s the risk to my security 
of believing in your declaration of no first use of force in any 
dispute with me? Further, what assurance do I have of your 
compliance with CBMs on an incident at sea (INCSEA) or 
rules of engagement agreement, or the regulation of your 
fishermen not to fish in waters I claim? 
What is my self-interest in being truthful and transparent 
in providing comprehensive and reliable data on my 
naval build-up in my Defence White Paper, when I have 
no assurance that you will reciprocate? Is it more in my 
self-interest to be opaque, perhaps not necessarily to deceive 
you, but more to keep you in a state of uncertainty about my 
plans for how I would react to you in a disagreement? Framed 
within the logic of this classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 
CBMs that require me to take the risk of surrendering my 
future wellbeing and security to you without any assurance 
or guarantees of your reciprocating my trust are therefore a 
non-starter. 
The second category of CBMs is those that are based on a 
normative framework, regime or institution we can agree to. 
Functional cooperation for the safety of navigation, search 
and rescue, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, or 
coastal zone management and environmental protection 
would be CBMs we can more easily accede to because they’re 
framed within some kind of institution or regime we can 
agree to. Moreover, functional cooperative CBMs are a low 
risk to my security and wellbeing if neither of us complies 
with them. 
The issue with this category of CBMs is their institutions and 
regimes that are expected to build confidence and trust, 
but our risk assessments of our interests inform us that they 
may threaten our interests. The UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the key CBM we’re all committed to. 
It is the regime on which we have all based our claims and 
counterclaims as to what we are entitled to do or assert 
a right to as ‘my territory’ in the South China Sea (and 
East China Sea). We have staked too much on UNCLOS to 
repudiate it. It’s held up as the regime for the management, if 
not resolution, of our disputes in the South China Sea.
But as a conflict management, and especially resolution, 
mechanism it could threaten our interests in the South China 
Sea if we submit our disputes with others to adjudication 
under UNCLOS. The code of conduct that ASEAN’s attempting 
to negotiate with China is probably another CBM on which we 
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Good evening ladies and gentlemen, thank you Peter for the 
opportunity to talk to you tonight. It’s always a little awkward 
to come into a conference dinner cold and talk about a 
subject that you have been listening to people talk about 
all day and here you are trying to relax a little. I hope that I 
will not cover too much of the same ground that you have 
traversed so far—if I do think of it as reinforcement!
Firstly, I am not going to solely focus on the South China 
Sea. As important as it is, I think that if we do not take an 
Indo-Pacific‘system wide’ view of the issue of maritime 
confidence building we run the risk looking at snapshots and 
micro-regions, no matter how important they are, in what is 
an intertwined and deeply interconnected system.
I will obviously tonight look at this issue principally through 
the naval lens; there are plenty of others here that will have 
already looked more broadly. I could do that but I think my 
value add is to give you a naval view which is but a slice of the 
bigger picture.
What is the end state that we seek at sea? Ultimately in my 
view it is to have good order at sea, something that is equally 
important for Australia, our allies, friends, partners and even 
our economic competitors.
Of course, good order at sea enables trade. For Australia, nine 
out of our top ten trading partners are in the Indo-Pacific—
only the UK is outside this area—and eight of the nine lie 
along the massive economic trading artery that runs from 
the Middle East, across the Indian Ocean, through the Strait 
of Malacca, into the South China Sea, past Japan, China and 
Korea and on North America.
Maritime trade—courtesy of bulk and containerised 
trades—has a pervasive influence and we are all 
dependent on it for our ongoing prosperity.
•	 98% of Australian trade by volume moves by sea; and
•	 70% of the output of our key bulk commodities are 
exported,
all of that by sea.
may need to consider the need for an institution to network 
not only the coastguards, but the other law enforcement 
agencies operating in the South China Sea. 
If prior notification of naval forces movements, manoeuvres 
and operations is a key prerequisite for building confidence 
and the beginning of trust, then regimes and institutions that 
enable the collection, collation and dissemination of this 
category of information would be a third category of CBMs we 
should work on to build trust. 
In this digital age, the issue is not a lack of information 
but an overload of information that has to be processed 
into reliable knowledge that we can trust and act upon. 
ReCAAP and the Information Fusion Centre provided by the 
Singapore Navy could be models for institutions in which 
all interested parties in the South China Sea participate to 
process all-source information into knowledge we can trust 
and act upon. 
In conclusion, we need to ask the worst case scenario 
question of what happens when the CBMs we plan for to build 
peace and security break down in an incident at sea? How do 
we prevent disputes and conflicts arising from, for example, 
a fishing trawler being fired upon by a coastguard vessel 
claiming the trawler is in waters protected by that vessel? 
Crisis management measures may well be the final category 
of CBMs we need to put in place to prevent the violent 
encounter between the fishing trawler and the coastguard 
vessel from escalating into a major stand-off between the 
law enforcement agencies and naval vessels despatched to 
protect the fishing trawler, which has been fired upon by the 
rival coastguard. 
Do we have ‘hotline’ communication channels in place and, 
more importantly, do we trust the conversations over that 
hotline to de-escalate the stand-off? Failing that, do we 
have on stand-by, in the ASEAN way, fact-finding missions 
and eminent persons groups to form goodwill missions to 
mediate in the crisis? We can only hope that what has become 
known as the ASEAN way of goodwill, patience and tolerance 
will prevail in a crisis over the next incident at sea in the 
South China Sea, despite an underlying distrust of the other.
 
About the author
Mr Kwa Chong Guan, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.
32 Special Report
Climate change is a broad topic and one which cannot be 
ignored. As you unpack the implications for the maritime 
environment and the Indo-Pacific region in particular, 
there are a number of issues which are of concern and will 
need management—humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, changes to the distribution of marine resources and 
potential forced migration being amongst the most obvious.
I think the uneven implementation of maritime security 
architectures across the Indo-Pacific is something else to 
take note of and focus our thoughts on.
However, it is the lack of a shared understanding of 
navigation rights and the tolerance for various forms of 
activities in offshore zones that is the key issue and the 
ongoing source of tension in a number of parts of the 
Indo-Pacific. Much of this stems from differing views on 
the relative weight of domestic versus international law in 
particular maritime zones. This is a significant issue for us 
to grapple with. It is a difficult issue to bring to the surface 
and problematic for officials in particular to discuss in these 
types of fora.
UNCLOS and all its associated mechanisms lie at the 
heart of this issue. I think UNCLOS does provide the basis 
for the answers just as it did as Australia, Indonesia and 
the US worked through the partial designation of the three 
Indonesian north-south archipelagic sea lanes in 1997.
Given these range of issues, building confidence among 
those key players involved in the cooperative and 
collaborative effort to keep the maritime trading system 
effective is critically important. As I said earlier I will focus on 
the naval dimension tonight even though it is a subset of the 
broader MCBM issue.
Confidence building measures in the maritime domain are 
not new of course. In fact the use of the term is something 
that takes us back in time to the Cold War, this is really 
where the genesis of the term comes from.
Much of the traditional thinking about confidence 
building measures was focused on nuclear weapons and 
disarmament. They were set against a bi-polar strategic 
system of two near peer powers and with a similar power 
gradient between them.
The landscape in the Indo-Pacific today is of course very 
different, it is not dominated by a bi-polar power structure, 
But, we must remember that there are fundamental 
vulnerabilities that our geo-strategic situation which exposes 
us to in such a highly interconnected and just in time 
economic system.
•	 40% of our two-way trade goes between just three 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) and most of it 
travels through waterways where maritime boundaries 
are not yet settled.
•	 Our strategic vulnerability to fuel supplies as highlighted 
by a recent NRMA study which reinforced the impact of 
any disruption to our maritime trading system.
The maritime environment is growing in importance in its 
own right, not just simply as a pathway for trade. The value 
we derive from the maritime environment is only likely to 
grow, be it offshore oil and gas installations, alternative 
energy generation or the value of maritime biodiversity 
reflected in both tourism and food security, particularly the 
value of farmed and wild fish stocks.
The maritime trading system is not owned by anyone but 
most benefit from it. It is a system that can only work 
effectively if there is a strong collaborative effort to keep it 
functioning. In my view, this drives us to cooperation.
The obvious conclusion for me at least is that all trading 
nations have a real interest in good order at sea and 
therefore a stable global maritime trading regime.
So what are the challenges across the Indo-Pacific? First, 
and foremost, is protecting our collective ability to trade. 
While I know this might be self-evident, particularly to 
an audience like this, I just don’t think we can emphasise 
it enough.
Containerised maritime trade has fundamentally changed 
the way economies work—we don’t have stockpiles of 
components anymore because the delivery is so predictable 
and so reliable; we don’t worry about where anything is 
made, because the cost of transporting it from almost 
anywhere to almost anywhere else is almost negligible. The 
cost of transporting a single shirt from Asia to Europe by sea 
is now one cent!
I think piracy in particular and maritime security more 
generally are issues which remain of concern—precisely 
because it has an impact on that trade and prosperity piece I 
have already mentioned.
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cooperation is to be viable. Much of this is again cultural; we 
are all shaped by our basic societal outlook and rightly by 
the experiences we have all had in our respective national 
security domains.
The need to know principle remains dominant, deeply rooted 
and relevant. The need to share is evolving but deep down, 
is not as well established. The two are often viewed as being 
mutually exclusive but I believe they can and should operate 
in harmony.
Technology is of course setting the pace here and in some 
cases dragging us into what is for some, uncomfortable 
territory. The important thing is that we are honest with 
ourselves about what our own disposition to share is—what 
is critically important to protect and what is critically 
important to share—but equally that we understand each 
other’s natural disposition. To do that we need to continue to 
build relationships because, without that understanding, we 
cannot move forward.
The next logical step once there is a disposition to share is 
to have a mechanism to share; again technology lies at the 
heart of this issue. We have certainly come a long way with a 
range of commercial systems that allow us to exchange data 
and information. In the purely military information domain, 
a domain that is shrinking in relation to the broader maritime 
security information domain, we still suffer from what I would 
call the ‘eyes only’ syndrome.
We are still locked in, to a certain extent, to rigidly defined 
security classification structures, which drive the architecture 
of our information exchange systems. Whether it is a 5, 27 or 
74 eyes community, it is an inherently limiting construct in an 
era where we need to form sometimes fleeting coalitions and 
groupings to deal with particular situations. Without a highly 
adaptable mechanism to share we are constraining ourselves. 
I am not saying we should not protect our vital information, 
now more than ever we need to do that, but I would venture 
to say that we still all tend to put far too much into the 
‘eyes only’ category. This doesn’t help the development of 
confidence building measures.
That said we should not ignore the non-technical 
mechanisms that support our ability to share; these are as 
important and in many ways more so than the technical 
solutions. Relationships, as I have mentioned is one; the 
need for collaboratively developed doctrinal approaches, 
quite the opposite. It is a diverse  region  with  more  
marked  power  gradients  and relationships. This makes 
the development of confidence building measures not only 
more important but more challenging. A relatively simple 
bilateral measure such as the 1972 INCSEA agreement 
no longer works in this environment. The answer is 
inherently more complex.
This year’s Australian Defence White Paper uses a term 
which has been around for a few years. The White Paper 
talks of regional security architectures and the ‘habits of 
cooperation’ they foster.1
I think many would accept that habits of cooperation are 
in some ways the desired output of maritime confidence 
building measures. But I would suggest at one level at least, 
they can form the inputs that lead to the development of 
these measures themselves.
When talking about habits of cooperation, it is critical to 
focus on those elements that make the most difference to us, 
those things that make the biggest strategic impact. When 
you list these elements they sound deceptively simple and 
not that profound.
Notwithstanding this, it is still very important to re-state the 
fundamentals so that they become accepted and eventually 
acted on. The key elements in my view are:
•	 Transparency,
•	 A disposition to share,
•	 A mechanism to share and, not least,
•	 A willingness to act together.
Transparency underpins any strategic cooperation regarding 
shared objectives and cuts to the very heart of confidence 
building. Of course there are a diverse range of cultural 
perspectives on transparency including fundamentally 
whether it is seen as a weakness or a strength, this, in itself 
sets up significant challenges at the outset.
I deliberately differentiate between transparency and the 
disposition to share. Transparency in this sense is more about 
clarity around strategic intent than exchanging information. 
If there is a clear view of the strategic intent which is matched 
by actual behaviours, confidence and eventually trust can 
be built.
Being transparent is one thing but it must also be 
accompanied by a disposition to share if any meaningful 
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new and broader maritime security dimension directly into 
IONS considerations.
I take over Chairmanship of IONS in March of next year which 
coincides with our national chairmanship of the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). IOR-ARC 
has existed for many years but its security focus is relatively 
new and in the first instance is focused on maritime security. 
It will be crucial that IONS and IOR-ARC, although operating 
at different levels, act in a complementary way—embedding 
this is a significant opportunity for Australia over the 
next 12–18 months. It is an important time in the Indian 
Ocean region as maritime security issues now have some 
prominence and traction. Our goal will be to build on the 
work of previous IONS chairs to cement IONS as part of the 
evolving maritime security architecture.
Regular exercises, be they HADR, SAR or fully fledged 
warfighting training activities, allow us to develop levels 
of interoperability and build trust, transparency and 
understanding that would otherwise not be possible. You 
only have to look at the evolution of the types of activities 
that we have undertaken with the PLA-N in recent years to 
make that point.
The confidence gained from these activities can, and does, 
directly translate into real world action that helps preserve 
both good order at sea and our ability to trade.
Coordinated patrols, separate from exercises, also offer some 
prospect of significantly building confidence. The reality is 
getting to the point where a coordinated patrol is agreed 
between nations is as important as the patrol itself. In our 
own case we have coordinated patrols with the Indonesian 
Navy each year in waters to our north. This has proved a 
very useful mechanism for both navies and has been an 
important part of a deepening and maturing of our bilateral 
naval relationship.
One area that we have seen a distinct willingness to act on 
in our region is the development of shared maritime domain 
awareness. The importance of what has been achieved 
here should not be taken lightly. Institutions such as the 
Singapore IFC are stand out examples.
I think more work on interactions at sea is essential. It should 
not be confined simply to the South China Sea because we 
are dealing with a system and the growth in international 
trade demands that we must be able to cooperate for good 
order at sea across the system, not just in one location.
mechanisms to avoid confusion and misinterpretation are 
others, if we really want strong cooperation.
But ultimately we need a collective willingness to act, borne 
out of a shared understanding of the common challenges 
that we face. We of course see many such examples of that 
willingness to act off the Horn of Africa, in the Combined 
Maritime Force, in NATO, the EU, in ReCAAP—to which 
Australia is just finalising its accession—in the Malacca Straits 
Patrols and of course in Singapore with the Information 
Fusion Centre (IFC).
That collective willingness to act is often enabled by 
established security architectures. The Indo-Pacific is 
fundamentally different to the Atlantic in relation to the 
number of strategic political and economic groupings with 
well-established security architectures. Notwithstanding, 
there are a number of relevant regional examples of strategic 
cooperation, such as the Expert Working Groups that 
have grown out of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings 
Plus structure.
The Maritime Security EWG is highly relevant and is currently 
co-chaired by ourselves and Malaysia. It was established 
in April 2011 and what appeals to me is not only the expert 
discussions, but how these have rapidly progressed to a 
table top exercise hosted by Malaysia in 2012 and soon a 
field training exercise to take place off the NSW coast later 
next month. This combination of activities is ideally suited to 
genuine learning and cooperation.
A mature mechanism in the Pacific context is the Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) which itself emerged 
from the germ of an idea at the International Seapower 
Symposium at Rhode Island. The cooperation in WPNS is 
excellent, be it in HADR or MCM, but of course it is still not 
without challenges.
WPNS is of course a confidence measure in and of itself; 
anything that helps to build relationships and manage 
interactions between navies is a good thing.
The Indian Ocean though is a different story; a critical 
waterway for all of us but one without a solid maritime 
security architecture. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 
(IONS) remains a nascent construct when compared with 
WPNS but one which offers good prospects. IONS is a quite 
different grouping to WPNS, with a much larger percentage 
of para-military or civil coastguard type ‘navies’ among 
its members. This does change the dynamic but brings a 
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Conference summary
With the support of the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, ASPI hosted the Maritime Confidence 
Building Measures in the South China Sea Conference in 
Sydney on 11–13 August 2013. The conference was attended 
by participants from 16 different member countries of the 
East Asia Summit. It was chaired by Mr Peter Jennings, 
Executive Director of ASPI. The objective of the conference 
was to develop proposals for prospective maritime 
confidence building measures (MCBMs) for the South China 
Sea (SCS).
Opening session
In his opening address (included in this report), the Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Bob Carr, 
observed that the issues before the conference are important 
ones for Australia’s strategic policy. He noted that while 
Australia doesn’t take a position on any of the competing 
claims in the SCS, it has direct interests in their peaceful 
settlement. Nearly two-thirds of Australia’s overseas trade 
moves across the South China and East China seas. Any 
conflict or serious miscalculations in managing the situation 
in the SCS would threaten the economic growth and stability 
of the entire Indo-Pacific region.
The keynote address for the conference (included in this 
report) was provided by Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal from 
Indonesia. He hoped that many ideas that would contribute 
to the development of peace, stability and cooperation in the 
SCS would come up during the conference. Those ideas could 
include procedures for avoiding and managing potential 
incidents that may take place between ships and aircraft of 
different countries.
Professor Djalal spoke of the contributions made by the 
workshops on managing potential conflict in the South 
China Sea that he has coordinated over the past 20 years. 
He observed that it had taken 11 years of discussion in the 
workshops and elsewhere to develop the 2002 ASEAN–China 
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC), and then a further 10 years before the guidelines 
on implementing the DOC were agreed. He thought that 
China seems positive and willing to cooperate on technical, 
scientific and environmental issues, less enthusiastic about 
developing cooperation on resources distribution issues, and 
The work being done in WPNS on unalerted encounters at sea 
is a good example. Although resolution of this has languished 
for some time, hopes are high that CUES (The Code for 
Unexpected Encounters at Sea) will finally be signed at the 
next major WPNS meeting in China next April. Its evolution 
has been difficult and in many ways mirrors the difficulties 
moving to an agreed code of conduct for the South China Sea 
between ASEAN and China.
But, it remains a cornerstone piece of work that will enable a 
much clearer understanding of what to expect in encounters 
at sea in the Western pacific more generally. There is a very 
strong commitment amongst WPNS members to see this 
through to a conclusion.
As the number of submarines increases across the region 
we need to work on strengthening the existing submarine 
water space management arrangements that are in place 
particularly where new submarine actors are involved. 
Building some confidence in this area would be useful but 
will of course take time given the additional sensitivities that 
national ownership of submarines bring.
We must however be careful not to seek a silver bullet 
solution to the maritime security challenges that we face. 
There is, in a global system, no single solution, but there are 
number of good models to draw on, expand and develop. 
We must also not get obsessed with measures as outcomes, 
our various cultural approaches again place different weight 
on the outcome as a Key Performance Indicator, the process 
of building the relationship is in many cases as important as 
where we are trying to get to.
In the end, I think efforts to establish and entrench the 
habits of cooperation, whether you view them as inputs 
or outputs, are critically important. And I think a focus on 
naval forces provides a high payoff for the effort given the 
role they play in the maritime environment. I am the last 
person to think this is easy but it is vitally important if we 
are to foster cooperation, build confidence and continue 
to enjoy the prosperity that flows from our global maritime 
trading system. 
 
Note
1  2013 Defence White Paper, p. 8, para 2.7.
About the speaker
VADM Ray Griggs AO, CSC, RAN, Chief of Navy.
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talk to each other, observing that while English is supposedly 
the international language of the sea, many seafarers and 
fishermen in charge of vessels at sea cannot speak English. 
While the adoption of CUES is voluntary, it potentially 
provides a simple code for communications between units of 
different countries. It’s important that CUES finds its way on 
to the bridges of both naval and civil law enforcement vessels 
operating in and around the SCS.
Mr Zhao Qinghai from the China Institute of International 
Studies discussed issues related to the US–China Military 
Maritime Consultative Agreement. Mr Zhao thought that 
the agreement provides a framework for dialogue, but is 
generally ineffective and should be amended. Both parties 
see value as well as limitations in the process. They’re 
suspicious of each other’s strategic intentions and there 
are three main obstacles to military exchanges: US ships 
and aircraft conducting close-in reconnaissance in China’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ); US arms sales to Taiwan; and 
US limitations on military-to-military exchanges and contacts 
with the People’s Liberation Army. The parties have different 
views about what’s required. China wants to shift attention 
away from operational safety to planning for naval exercises 
and other navy-to-navy contacts, while the US wants a 
‘hotline’ arrangement with clear lines of communication 
between responsible operational commanders at all 
levels. Increased navy-to-navy practical engagement is 
an important way of taking the relationship forward in a 
constructive manner.
Captain Dr Sukjoon Yoon ROK-N (Rtd) addressed MCBMs in 
Northeast Asia. He described the several conceptual MCBMs 
in the region but noted that none has been supported by 
a mandatory operational framework. Due to intractable 
problems of interpretation, including nationalistic 
sensitivities, regional rivalry and a historical legacy of 
distrust, it’s proved impossible to achieve operational 
MCBMs. He identified several issues. First, political will 
is a vital prerequisite for functional MCBMs. Second, the 
continuing militarisation of the disputed islands and areas is 
not helpful, and this is exacerbated by the three-dimensional 
complexity of their boundaries (air, surface and subsurface). 
Third, command and control systems are opaque and 
confused, typically blurring operational command and 
control chains between navies and coastguards. Fourth, 
the lack of operational manuals and rules of engagement 
least interested in talking about territorial, sovereignty and 
jurisdictional issues.
Session 1: Concepts of MCBMs
Session 1 provided an overview of the nature and types of 
MCBMs and maritime regimes and a summary of existing 
regional MCBMs. Dr Sam Bateman from the Australian 
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security reviewed 
the concept of MCBMs, distinguishing between military 
MCBMs related to the activities of military forces and 
non-military MCBMs primarily related to cooperative 
management of the maritime domain. The latter measures 
provide a direct benefit by helping to build maritime 
regimes that provide good order at sea and permit effective 
management of the maritime domain while also serving as 
‘building blocks’ for habits of cooperation and dialogue that 
reduce tensions and promote peace and stability.
Dr Mark Valencia, a private maritime consultant from the US 
with a long involvement in SCS issues, discussed multilateral 
maritime regimes in the SCS. He described the SCS as a 
‘regime desert’ with few effective maritime regimes. Whereas 
in the past he had hoped that regimes in non-traditional 
security areas could lead to positive outcomes related to 
more traditional security, he’s now less confident—bilateral 
arrangements in non-traditional areas may be all that’s 
possible. He believed it would be more efficient now to focus 
directly on traditional security measures in a broad strategic 
sense—not necessarily military. These might be based on 
major instruments such as the UN Charter, the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Declaration 
on a[n ASEAN] Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 
the Bangkok Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone 
Treaty, and the DOC. Dr Valencia noted the slow progress 
towards a code of conduct, believing that confidence among 
and between nations in the region is waning. Fundamental 
principles, such as no threat or use of force, haven’t taken 
root in the SCS.
The following panellists discussed various existing MCBMs 
relevant to the SCS. Captain Justin Jones RAN from the 
Sea Power Centre—Australia briefed the conference on 
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and its Code for 
Unalerted Encounters between Ships (CUES). He noted the 
fundamental importance of ships and aircraft being able to 
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challenge. However, military and safety issues now dominate 
the maritime security agenda and environmental and 
resource management issues have been politicised. A focus 
on sovereignty and territorial disputes discourages full civil 
maritime cooperation.
Mr Baker provided useful feedback on the four maritime 
security workshops conducted by the Pacific Forum CSIS 
during 2012. The workshops were on maritime domain 
awareness, maritime environment and safety, maritime 
governance and law enforcement, and maritime defence, 
each reflecting US interests in maritime issues. The 
workshops found low confidence in dispute resolution 
mechanisms, coupled with some concern that ASEAN’s 
principles, particularly consensus decision-making, 
complicated dispute resolution. However, they noted 
opportunities for civil maritime cooperation, including the 
establishment of a regional civilian-based disaster response 
capability, joint hydrocarbon exploration projects, and 
expanded regional fisheries management. In conclusion, Mr 
Baker observed that civil maritime cooperation is different 
from military confidence-building.
Panellists then addressed particular areas where functional 
cooperation might be established or further developed.
Dr Nguyen Lan Anh from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 
discussed fisheries cooperation in the SCS. She identified a 
strong rationale for CBMs in fisheries, including the economic 
benefits and the potential for win–win solutions. Several 
forums exist to facilitate the necessary cooperation, but they 
have limitations due to the limited participation of China and 
the lack of political will, capacity and good scientific data on 
which to base management plans. According to Dr Nguyen, 
fisheries have become politicised and are being used as tools 
to strengthen maritime claims. Nevertheless, there are good 
opportunities for MCBMs, including seafarer training and 
capacity building, a code of conduct for the fair treatment 
of fishermen, ‘hotlines’, and search and rescue for missing 
fishing vessels, as well as scope for experience sharing and 
technical assistance from countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, South Korea and India.
Dr Lowell Bautista from the Australian National Centre 
for Ocean Resources and Security at the University of 
Wollongong addressed the scope for cooperation in marine 
scientific research. Significant difficulties are the lack of 
definition of what constitutes marine scientific research 
procedures for the on-scene commanders in the disputed 
seas is another issue likely to cause miscalculations.
Captain Martin Sebastian from the Maritime Institute of 
Malaysia discussed existing MCBMs in Southeast Asia. He 
prefaced his comments by observing that the resources 
of the SCS are critically important to Malaysia, and that 
strategically the sea binds East and West Malaysia together. 
He went on to describe current cooperative arrangements 
in the Malacca Strait and the bilateral agreements between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Captain Sebastian speculated 
on the need to recognise the economic importance of the 
SCS and whether we were talking about confidence- or 
security-building measures. He saw opportunities to enhance 
resource security through cooperative research and law 
enforcement and identified a role for resources industries (oil 
and gas and fisheries) in advancing security.
In the subsequent discussion period, several participants 
focused on the relationship between confidence and trust, 
observing that a trust deficit currently exists. Prospects for 
a regional incidents at sea agreement (INCSEA) were also 
mentioned, with the comments that any such arrangement 
couldn’t just be navy-to-navy, and that in any case law 
enforcement isn’t a core business of navies.
Session 2: Functional cooperation
Two lead speakers opened up Session 2, addressing 
issues associated with functional cooperation, including 
previous cooperative efforts, the current state of maritime 
cooperation and prospective areas for cooperation. 
Professor Wu Shicun from the National Institute for South 
China Sea Studies discussed ASEAN–China cooperation in 
the SCS. He referred to Part IX of UNCLOS and the 2002 DOC 
as the two bases for cooperation. The sovereignty disputes 
and overlapping maritime claims are fundamental obstacles 
to cooperation, but China is committed to promoting 
cooperation. Possible areas for cooperation include oil spill 
prevention, a truly coordinated approach to search and 
rescue, marine scientific research and ecological protection.
The other lead speaker, Mr Carl Baker from the Pacific 
Forum CSIS, addressed functional maritime cooperation 
in the SCS. He identified the range of regional and global 
mechanisms and institutions that in theory at least provide 
a basis for cooperation. He reminded the conference that 
effective civil cooperation is both a national and a regional 
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exist, but there are major gaps in the level of ratification of 
relevant international instruments by SCS littoral countries. 
Dr Batongbacal noted increased levels of suspicion and 
distrust between the littoral states and low expectations 
for MCBMs at this stage. Certain measures, such as the joint 
designation of specific areas for protection, are unlikely to 
build confidence at this point. Other measures might be more 
feasible, such as exchanges of information and personnel 
and the involvement of the private sector (such as the 
petroleum industry).
The last panellist in Session 2, Mr Leo Bernard from 
the Centre for International Law, National University of 
Singapore, discussed the prospects for joint development 
of the oil and gas resources of the SCS. He noted that joint 
development is a long-term commitment that’s difficult 
to negotiate. There are prerequisites, including political 
will, an acceptance that joint development is not giving up 
sovereignty, and agreement on the area for development. 
The more claimants there are to a particular area, the greater 
the difficulty in agreeing on arrangements. Hence, there’s 
greater potential for joint development in areas where there 
are only two claimants, such as around Scarborough Shoal 
and the Paracels.
In opening up the discussion period, the Conference Chair 
mentioned that he was starting to see some success stories 
about functional cooperation, particularly at the bilateral 
level. Several themes emerged in discussion. First, the 
possibility of non-spatial joint development was raised, 
including joint research, fisheries management that’s 
not confined to narrowly defined areas, and marine data 
systems, such as a geographic information system (GIS). 
Second, it was noted that there’s no current mechanism in 
which functional cooperation might be negotiated. Third, the 
need for some dialogue with industry was suggested.
Session 3: Operational and legal 
considerations
Dr Tran Truong Thuy from the Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam opened up Session 3 with a presentation on 
cooperation for good order at sea, specifically addressing 
ideas and suggestions for avoiding and managing incidents 
at sea in the SCS. He identified military, law enforcement, 
research and civilian agencies as the main players in 
and differences in interpretation of what’s involved. 
Dr Bautista described past cooperative programs: the Joint 
Oceanographic Marine Scientific Research Expedition in the 
South China Sea and the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking. 
While those programs haven’t been entirely successful, 
there’s still potential for ‘without prejudice’ cooperation in 
marine scientific research, an expanded research agenda, 
and mechanisms for database and information exchange, 
but strong and sustained littoral state support and state or 
international organisational leadership is required.
Commodore Brett Brace RAN from the Australian 
Hydrographic Service made the initial point that hydrography 
is broader than hydrographic surveying. Hydrography 
is ‘the branch of applied sciences which deals with the 
measurement and description of the physical features of 
oceans, seas, coastal areas, lakes and rivers, as well as with 
the prediction of their change over time, for the primary 
purpose of safety of navigation and in support of all other 
marine activities, including economic development, 
security and defence, scientific research, and environmental 
protection’1, whereas hydrographic surveying is the actual 
collection of hydrographic data.
Cooperation is essential to hydrography, and the 
International Hydrographic Organization has encouraged 
the establishment of regional hydrographic commissions 
to coordinate hydrographic activity and cooperation at the 
regional level. The East Asia Hydrographic Commission is the 
regional body that covers the SCS. Its main achievements 
include the publication of the SCS Electronic Navigational 
Charts in 2005 and the establishment of a task group in 
2006 to work on the charts’ consistency and coverage of 
the region. Commodore Brace noted in conclusion that 
hydrography provides an existing framework for international 
and regional cooperation upon which to undertake 
MCBMs, specifically for marine environmental protection, 
marine scientific research and the safety of navigation and 
communication at sea.
Dr Jay Batongbacal from the University of the Philippines 
discussed cooperation for protecting the marine 
environment. He noted that while there are good reasons to 
cooperate with marine environmental protection, there are 
also grounds for competition, including cultural differences, 
national self-interest, and little belief in the validity of 
‘non-prejudicial’ clauses. Multiple modalities for cooperation 
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include fair treatment of fishermen, refraining from the threat 
or use of force, hotlines, non-use of military vessels, and a 
coastguard forum for the SCS.
Dr Tran noted that accidents at sea can be avoided by existing 
regulations, but preventing and managing intentional 
incidents requires the negotiation of new agreements (both 
bilateral and multilateral), including either just the littoral 
SCS countries or, where appropriate, the non-regional 
stakeholders as well. He presented the layers of potential 
agreements diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 1.
Ms Jane Chan from the Maritime Security Programme at 
the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 
Singapore, discussed maritime information sharing in the 
SCS. She characterised current responses as either ‘top 
down’ through the ASEAN Maritime Forum, the Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
incidents at sea and then described some of the incidents 
that have occurred in recent years.
For each category of incident (military activities; fishing 
in disputed areas; seismic survey, oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation; and marine scientific research), Dr Tran 
identified optimistic and feasible options for managing 
incidents at sea between the units of the different categories 
of players. For military activities, the optimistic options 
include INCSEA agreements and a common interpretation of 
UNCLOS, while the feasible options include prior notification 
of exercises and surveys in foreign EEZs; establishing hotlines 
of communication; dialogue and discussion immediately 
after an incident occurs; and establishing a South China 
Sea Navy Forum. For the other categories of incident, 
optimistic options include boundary delimitations and joint 
development agreements, while the more feasible options 
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and 2005 under the sponsorship of the Ocean Policy 
Research Foundation. Considering that seven years have 
elapsed since the guidelines were published and that the 
security environment in the seas in East Asia has changed 
significantly, the foundation has decided to undertake a 
two-year project to review the guidelines. Draft ‘Principles for 
Building Confidence and Security in the Exclusive Economic 
Zones of States in the Asia–Pacific’ are to be considered at a 
meeting in late October 2013 in Tokyo.
Dr Li Mingjiang from RSIS, Singapore, began his comments by 
saying that cooperation for maritime security and avoiding 
and managing incidents at sea depends on political will 
and political solutions. He noted that there are different 
layers of incidents related to, first, sovereignty issues that 
are best left to the claimant parties; security management, 
which is primarily an issue between ASEAN and China 
with extraregional countries only having marginal roles; 
and non-traditional security issues that involve all littoral 
countries plus the extraregional stakeholders. He noted the 
difficulties in building confidence and trust in any part of the 
SCS and saw any progress that has been made, including 
between China and Vietnam, as largely symbolic. There’s 
potential, however, for linking CBMs with commercial and 
economic developments, including joint ventures in fisheries 
and aquaculture. Dr Li also mentioned the possibility of 
cooperation for environmental protection and managing the 
effects of climate change (especially sea-level rise).
Captain Ronnie Gavan from the Philippine Coast Guard had 
been asked to speak in this session on the concepts of Coast 
Watch South in the tri-border area between Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia and the National Coast Watch 
System and their possible value as models for the SCS. He 
was unable to attend, but provided some useful talking 
points. He noted the problem faced by the Philippines, where 
multiple agencies have mandates for maritime security 
governance, and that the National Coast Watch System 
is intended to get around this problem with a whole-of-
government approach to maritime domain awareness and 
ensure a coordinated approach to the multiple threats in the 
maritime domain. The National Coast Watch System built 
on experience with Coast Watch South, which harmonises 
naval and civil maritime command and control systems in the 
southern Philippines through a central coordinating centre in 
Zamboanga City.
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security and the 
ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security, 
or ‘bottom up’ bilateral and multilateral efforts, such as 
under the Malacca Strait Patrols arrangements, the ReCAAP 
Information Sharing Centre, and the Singapore Navy’s 
Information Fusion Centre. The Information Fusion Centre 
now has 54 international liaison officers from 16 countries, 
and China, Myanmar and South Korea are soon to send their 
own. It’s also established arrangements for engagement with 
the shipping industry. The centre’s area of interest extends 
from Sri Lanka in the west to Papua in the east and from the 
Timor Sea north to Taiwan. The ASEAN Information-sharing 
Portal is a unique platform for regional commanders of 
ASEAN navies to chat and share information through the use 
of a smartphone application.
Lieutenant Colonel Arief Meidyanto from Badan Koordinasi 
Keamanan Laut (Bakorkamla), Indonesia, addressed 
experiences in interagency coordination (both national and 
regional). Indonesia faces a huge problem with maritime law 
enforcement and, with some 12 agencies involved, there’s 
a need for increased agency coordination with perhaps a 
single maritime security and safety agency (Bakamla). Illegal 
fishing is a major problem for Indonesia, and as an example 
of the problems that can arise Colonel Meidyanto discussed a 
case that occurred during the interception on 26 March 2013 
of a Chinese fishing vessel by the Indonesian patrol vessel 
Hiu Macan 001 patrolling the Indonesian EEZ in the Natuna 
Sea, and the subsequent interception by two Chinese patrol 
vessels that required the release of the Chinese fishing vessel 
by using the threat of force. In conclusion, Colonel Meidyanto 
also encouraged the ASEAN Maritime Forum to focus on 
coordinating regional arrangements for law enforcement, 
search and rescue, hydrographic surveying, humanitarian 
assistance, marine safety, fisheries, marine environmental 
protection, and marine scientific research.
Rear Admiral Kazumine Akimoto JMSDF (Rtd) from the 
Ocean Policy Research Foundation of Japan spoke of the 
problems with incidents occurring in regional EEZs and a 
consequent need for guidelines related to navigation and 
overflight in EEZs. The greater part of the East Asian seas is 
claimed by regional states as their EEZs, and disputes exist 
over the interpretation and application of relevant articles 
in UNCLOS. Admiral Akimoto described the Guidelines for 
Navigation and Overflight in the EEZ that were developed 
by the EEZ Group 21 over several meetings between 2002 
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as a weakness or a strength, and this sets up significant 
challenges at the outset. Much of the disposition to share 
is again cultural. Technology’s a key issue underpinning a 
mechanism to share. The development of CBMs is hindered 
by rigidly defined security classification structures, which 
drive the architecture of information exchange systems. 
Admiral Griggs observed that non-technical mechanisms, 
such as interpersonal relations, support our ability to share—
in many ways more than do the technical solutions.
Lastly, Admiral Griggs discussed the various forums involved 
in CBMs, including the expert working groups established 
by the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus, the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium and Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre. He 
noted that as the number of submarines increases across the 
region work is required on strengthening existing submarine 
water space management arrangements, particularly by 
involving new submarine actors. His final caution was that 
we must not get obsessed with measures as outcomes. Our 
various cultural approaches again place different weights on 
the outcomes as key performance indicators, and the process 
of building the relationship is in many cases as important as 
where we’re trying to get to.
Session 4: Prospective MCBMs
The last session comprised a lead speaker and panellists 
from countries represented at the conference, followed by 
a general discussion. The session was designed to develop 
ideas for MCBMs based on previous proposals and positions 
of key protagonists and to re-emphasise the importance of 
MCBMs and maritime cooperation as a building block for 
more effective management of the SCS and its resources.
The lead speaker, Mr Kwa Chong Guan from RSIS, Singapore, 
provided an overview of the need for confidence building 
in the SCS (his comments are included elsewhere in this 
report). His main theme was the difficulty of deciding which 
CBMs are likely to succeed and which aren’t. He pointed out 
that CBMs are underpinned by trust, arguing that trust is 
the key element involving a rational calculation of risk and 
whether or not the parties involved could trust each other 
to conform to a CBM. He saw trust not as an end state or 
product of CBMs, or a necessary beginning for CBMs, but as 
an interactive process of trust and building confidence, which 
is underpinned by trust. The challenge is how to cooperate 
The Coast Watch South and National Coast Watch System 
concepts have highlighted some important lessons that 
are relevant to the SCS, including the importance of 
interpersonal relationships and the conduct of cross-border 
operations without an agreed boundary delimitation. The 
Philippines now has bilateral arrangements with Vietnam, 
China, Malaysia and Indonesia that provide for cooperation 
on a range of cross-border activities, as well as a multilateral 
agreement with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand on an oil spill response plan. These are facilitated by 
what Captain Gavan referred to as ‘white ships diplomacy’, 
which he saw as having particular utility for CBMs in the SCS.
The discussion period included references to the implications 
of new technologies, including the use of unmanned 
vehicles, such as drones, for surveillance purposes, and the 
importance of naval and coastguard units having clear rules 
of engagement.
Dinner address
The dinner address at the conference (included in this report) 
was provided by Vice Admiral Ray Griggs AO, CSC, RAN, Chief 
of Navy, Australia. Rather than just focusing on the SCS, he 
took a broader Indo-Pacific ‘system-wide’ view of maritime 
confidence building. He highlighted the importance of 
seaborne trade to Australia—maritime trade has a pervasive 
influence and all regional countries are dependent on it for 
their ongoing prosperity. He went on to refer to the many 
challenges to good order at sea in the Indo-Pacific region, 
including the lack of a shared understanding of navigation 
rights and the tolerance for various forms of activities 
in offshore zones. Given this range of issues, building 
confidence among key players involved in cooperative and 
collaborative efforts to keep the maritime trading system 
effective is critically important.
Admiral Griggs observed that a relatively simple bilateral 
measure such as the 1972 INCSEA agreement won’t 
work in the current environment and that the answer’s 
inherently more complex. The key elements in his view are 
transparency, a disposition to share, a mechanism to share 
and, not least, a willingness to act together. Transparency 
underpins any strategic cooperation towards shared 
objectives and cuts to the very heart of confidence building. 
However, there’s a diverse range of cultural perspectives 
on transparency, including fundamentally whether it’s seen 
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•	 Fisheries management is a potential CBM, noting 
the bilateral arrangements already agreed between 
Indonesia and Malaysia and Malaysia and China.
•	 Maritime boundary agreements should be actively 
pursued—‘good fences make good neighbours’.
•	 Claims should be resolved before legislation is put in 
place—domestic legislation becomes an obstacle to 
progress.
•	 Stirring up public opinion should be avoided.
•	 The implications of new technologies (such as 
drones) and operational procedures should be 
reviewed.
•	 Guidelines covering rights and duties in the EEZ are 
needed.
•	 There’s a need to keep talking about joint 
development.
•	 Military activities in the SCS should not be extended.
•	 There’s a need to identify and agree on projects for 
cooperation (such as hydrographic surveying and 
fisheries stock assessments).
Captain Justin Jones RAN speculated about whether the ‘big 
picture’ has been lost, including the potential impact of crises 
on regional and national prosperity and the basic importance 
of common interests, notably seaborne trade. There’s a need 
to recognise what INCSEA agreements are and what they 
aren’t. Captain Jones thought that corporate memory is 
lacking and that there may be a case for permanent envoys to 
promote MCBMs.
Mr Carl Baker speculated on the need for an appropriate 
forum to take MCBMs forward, particularly through 
functional cooperation. He noted the importance of 
functional cooperation to build trust, suggesting that 
there’s potential for it and mentioning disaster relief, oil spill 
management and fisheries management as particular issues. 
He also noted the need to talk about rights and duties in 
the EEZ.
Closing remarks
In his closing remarks, the Conference Chair noted that the 
conference and the 25 speakers had been on a remarkable 
journey over the meeting’s one and a half days, and that 
many different insights and useful ideas had emerged. 
and build confidence without trust. This suggests a need to 
start with low-risk CBMs, including some form of confidence 
building and cooperation between the coastguards many 
littoral states have established. In the final analysis, we can 
only hope that what’s become known as the ASEAN way of 
goodwill, patience and tolerance will prevail in a crisis in the 
SCS despite an underlying distrust of the other.
In the discussion session that followed Mr Kwa’s talk, a 
growing distinction was noted between trust building 
measures and CBMs. Trust has more of a political dimension 
with domestic political implications. Reference was made to 
the high levels of distrust currently apparent in the region.
Dr Wu Shicun had three main concerns in his comments: 
China is an equal partner in the SCS; external powers should 
not be involved; and the code of conduct should be seen as 
a crisis management tool rather than as a means of dispute 
resolution. On joint development, he thought that there are 
no potential areas where this might be possible.
Captain Martin Sebastian distinguished between CBMs, 
which might include law enforcement activities, and 
security building measures reflecting both traditional and 
non-traditional security issues. He pointed out that law 
enforcement isn’t the core business of navies and that law 
enforcement, along with search and rescue and marine 
environmental protection, involves key interests that 
require attention regardless of any distrust apparent in the 
security environment.
Dr Jay Batongbacal from the Philippines saw a role for 
the International Maritime Organization along the lines of 
the activity it had sponsored leading to the Cooperative 
Mechanism for Safety and Marine Environmental Protection 
in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. He also mentioned 
climate change and coastal zone management (both 
particular concerns of the Philippines), law enforcement and 
interagency coordination and cooperation, and exchanges 
with industry.
Dr Tran Truong Thuy from Vietnam referred again to the 
high levels of distrust that existed in the region at present—
between Vietnam and China, between the US and China and 
even within ASEAN. He also mentioned law of the sea issues 
and the CBMs required for the different maritime zones.
Professor Hasjim Djalal from Indonesia had nine suggestions:
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Economic interests, including industry, also have a role to 
play. The Chair noted that it was remarkable how economists 
and strategists thought about the issues differently. The 
rational economic actor would of course argue strongly for 
the continuation of peace and stability. Mr Jennings asked 
whether there are prospects of bringing together major 
private sector interests—the raw material producers, port 
owners, shipping firms, logistic chain managers and fisheries 
organisations—into a discussion with governments on their 
security needs.
The Chair thought that there’s also a useful role for auditing 
and consolidating the huge volume of useful practical 
cooperation that’s taking place in the SCS—from managing 
fish stocks to hydrographic cooperation. This might take 
the form of a handbook providing a reference guide for 
regional maritime engagement best practice. In all of these 
areas, though, there’s a need to progress from dialogue to 
actionable outcomes.
Mr Jennings observed that the value of the work that’s been 
done over many years shouldn’t be lost. Professor Djalal had 
reminded the conference that it took 11 years from 1991 for 
an informal code to be accepted into the ASEAN Declaration 
of Conduct in 2002. That means hard work is needed to retain 
the gains that have been made.
The published proceedings of the conference will be taken 
forward into appropriate regional gatherings, possibly the 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum. Appropriate ASEAN 
processes and Australian processes will be considered. The 
overall objective will be to develop actionable proposals for 
prospective MCBMs in the region.
Note
1 International Hydrographic Organization, Definition of 
hydrography, www.iho.int/srv1/index.php?option=com_conten
t&view=article&id=299&Itemid=289.
The conference had been fortunate in having among its 
participants several people who have been working on this 
complex array of issues for 20 years or more. Mr Jennings 
went on to say that while most of the ideas about MCBMs had 
been around for many years, strategic circumstances had 
changed, making the need for progress in military and civilian 
maritime CBMs more urgent than ever.
A key issue is the economic importance of the seaborne trade 
through the East Asian seas and the implications for the 
Indo-Pacific region as a whole should that trade be disrupted 
in any way. The SCS is a focusing lens for this strategic 
system, and MCBMs, both military and civilian, have a critical 
role to play.
Much discussion during the conference had returned to the 
‘chicken and egg’ dilemma of which came first between trust, 
on the one hand, and confidence in a regime on the other. 
One school of thought is that arrangements for functional 
cooperation on issues such as resources management, 
marine scientific research and marine environmental 
protection are MCBMs or trust-building measures. The other 
school of thought is that this functional cooperation can’t 
proceed without strategic trust. Finding a solution to this 
dilemma is extremely difficult. Several participants had 
referred to the higher levels of distrust in the region. This 
makes negotiating functional cooperation extremely difficult, 
although some forms of bilateral cooperation appear to be 
having success.
Several participants had pointed out that cooperation is not 
just something that’s nice to have—it’s both an obligation 
and a necessity. Without cooperation, fisheries are being 
overfished, marine habitats are being destroyed, large areas 
of the SCS remain unsurveyed, and littoral countries lack 
the scientific knowledge required for the effective exercise 
of their sovereign rights in adjacent waters. A possible way 
out of the basic dilemma is to try to disconnect essential 
civil maritime cooperation from the military and sovereignty 
issues, which are the root causes of distrust. A forum 
bringing together the agencies of littoral countries that 
deal with law enforcement, search and rescue, and marine 
environmental protection might help in this regard, as well 
as the active pursuit of cooperative programs to address 
clear common interests, such as fish stock assessments and 
hydrographic surveying.
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by Indonesia. However, strategic circumstances have 
deteriorated in recent years due to increased tensions 
between the countries with conflicting claims to features 
within the SCS, as well as between the major regional 
powers. The active pursuit of cooperative programmes and 
MCBMs will help ease regional tensions and over-come the 
current trust deficit. 
Concepts of MCBMs
The conference reviewed the nature and types of maritime 
confidence building measures (MCBMs) and maritime regimes 
with a summary of existing regional MCBMs, such as the Code 
for Unalerted Encounters between Ships (CUES) developed 
by the Western Naval Symposium (WPNS), the agreements to 
prevent incidents between naval forces (INCSEA Agreements) 
between Russia and South Korea and Russia and Japan), 
MALINDO (the INCSEA Agreement between Malaysia 
and Indonesia), and the Military Maritime Consultative 
Arrangements (MMCA) (between China and the US).
Several participants emphasised the importance of 
communications. The ability of law enforcement and naval 
units of different countries to talk to each other was a very 
basic tool to prevent and manage incidents at sea. The simple 
communications code that was part of CUES provided this 
facility. It could be more widely used.
CBMs may be loosely defined as practical efforts to remove 
the causes of misunderstanding, while MCBMs specifically 
are those that apply in the maritime environment. In this 
context maritime does not refer solely to the sea, nor does 
it apply only to navies. MCBMs also encompass the land-sea 
interface (the ‘littoral’) and pertain to all vessels, aircraft, and 
organisations and agencies associated therewith.
A distinction can be made between MCBMs of a military 
nature and those of a non-military nature. Military MCBMs 
can have a political focus, such as with making the good 
intentions of a country more apparent (‘transparent’) and 
with agreements not to conduct certain types of maritime 
operation in a particular area or not to acquire certain 
technologies of maritime warfare. Or they might have an 
operational focus, as for example with the exchange of 
maritime surveillance information, the provision of prior 
notification of particular naval activities (e.g. exercises), or 
INCSEA Agreements.
Chairman’s final statement
The Sydney Conference on Maritime Confidence Building 
Measures (MCBMs) in the South China Sea was attended by 62 
participants from 16 different member countries of the East 
Asia Summit. It was hosted by the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI).
The objective of the conference was to develop actionable 
proposals for prospective MCBMs for the South China Sea 
(SCS). The conference assessed:
•	 The potential for increased maritime cooperation in 
the SCS in functional areas, such as law enforcement, 
search and rescue (SAR), hydrographic surveying, 
humanitarian assistance, marine safety, fisheries, 
marine environmental protection, and marine 
scientific research; and
•	 Possible procedures for avoiding and managing 
incidents that might occur at seas between ships and 
aircraft of different countries.
The major challenge with the SCS is to build a stable maritime 
regime that provides for good order at sea, eases tensions 
and reduces the risk of conflict. To assist in meeting this 
challenge, the conference developed a set of recommended 
measures that may contribute to regional policy making 
through an appropriate regional forum, possibly the 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).
Strategic Considerations
Both Senator Bob Carr, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
in his opening address, and Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, the 
Chief of the Australian Navy, in his dinner speech highlighted 
the importance of seaborne trade through the SCS. This 
was a common interest of all regional counties, as well as 
of counties outside of Southeast Asia, including Australia, 
which have vital trade routes passing through or near the 
SCS.  Any disruption of shipping traffic as a result of conflict 
or serious miscalculations between the littoral countries 
would compromise the economic growth and prosperity of 
the entire region.
The conference acknowledged the good work done in the 
past, and was continuing to be done, by the Workshops 
on Managing Potential Conflict in the SCS coordinated 
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SCS, living and non-living, as well as growing concern for the 
protection and preservation of the sea’s sensitive eco-
systems and marine biodiversity.
Conference speakers provided useful suggestions regarding 
how functional cooperation might be improved. These 
suggestions included:
•	 Cooperative arrangements to ensure the safety 
and security of offshore oil and gas installations in 
the SCS.
•	 Coordinated marine scientific research programs 
in the SCS, noting that marine scientific research 
(including seismic surveys) is essential for effective 
management of the SCS and its resources.
•	 Cooperative arrangements to protect the 
marine environment.
•	 The establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) 
in the SCS.
•	 The establishment of a SCS forum bringing together 
the coast guards and other para-military maritime 
law enforcement forces of littoral and adjacent 
countries.
•	 A coordinated approach to marine oil spills in 
the SCS.
•	 The establishment of an SCS fisheries management 
and conservation forum.
•	 Agreed rules and standards for regional fish stocks 
and protocols for managing fishermen.
•	 Agreement on a plan for conducting hydrographic 
surveys in certain uncharted areas of the SCS.
•	 Coordinated arrangements for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief in the SCS.
•	 The establishment of a marine information data base 
for the SCS.
•	 Protocols for submarine rescue and escape.
The conference welcomed China’s proposed ASEAN-China 
Maritime Cooperation Fund. It noted the agreement to 
establish four expert committees on marine scientific 
research, environmental protection, search and rescue and 
transnational crime prevention.
Non-military MCBMs are mainly about building regimes and 
cooperation to provide good order at sea. They serve two 
purposes. Firstly, they provide a direct benefit by helping 
to build maritime regimes that provide good order at sea 
and permit effective management of the maritime domain. 
Secondly, they serve as ‘building blocks’ for habits of 
cooperation and dialogue that reduce tensions and promote 
peace and stability.
Maritime Cooperation in the SCS
The conference addressed issues associated with functional 
maritime cooperation, including previous cooperative 
efforts, the current state of maritime cooperation and 
prospective areas for cooperation. It noted the obligations to 
cooperate in Part IX of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), and the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on 
Conduct of Parties in the SCS. 
The importance of cooperation to manage the maritime 
domain and its resources cannot be overstated. Cooperation 
is essential for good order at sea and effective maritime 
management. However, a lack of trust exists between 
neighbouring countries with unresolved sovereignty 
disputes, and this inhibits successful cooperation. 
Similarly, exclusive forms of cooperation between a select 
group of countries can lead to a breakdown in trust when 
other countries are excluded from the arrangement. While 
bilateral cooperation between neighbouring countries 
should be encouraged, multilateral cooperation in the SCS 
should as far as possible be inclusive of all littoral countries.
A ‘chicken and egg’ situation has emerged in the SCS. 
What comes first – cooperation as a confidence-building 
measure (CBM), or strategic trust? Some believe that 
arrangements for functional cooperation on issues such 
as resources management, marine scientific research and 
marine environmental protection are CBMs or trust-building 
measures. Others claim that this functional cooperation 
cannot proceed without strategic trust.
The demands for effective cooperative management regimes 
in the SCS will become more pressing in the future. Volumes 
of shipping traffic will continue to increase with greater risks 
of ship-sourced marine pollution and shipping accidents. 
There will be increased pressure on the resources of the 
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ahead is the need to identify common interests that might 
provide the basis of successful MCBMs.
Preventing and Managing Incidents in the SCS
Potentially a key common interest is the need to have 
in place arrangements that might assist in preventing 
misunderstandings between vessels and aircraft of different 
countries and managing incidents that might occur. 
The conference noted in this regard that a tactical level 
document, such as the existing bilateral INCSEA agreements 
in the region, was unlikely to be achieved and in any case, the 
CUES document was already in place. An alternative might be 
broader guidelines at the strategic and operational level.
However, any document should be non-binding so as to 
ensure its wide acceptance. Also, it should not be called a 
‘code of conduct’ to avoid any conflict with the political Code 
of Conduct now being negotiated between China and the 
ASEAN countries.
A possible title is ‘Guidelines for Preventing and Managing 
Incidents at Sea in the South China Sea’. In drafting the 
guidelines, the relevance of existing documents, such 
as MALINDO and CUES should be examined. The latter 
document is very relevant as all countries bordering the SCS 
are members of the WPNS.
Any such  guidelines might address issues such as:
•	 Non-naval vessels and non-military aircraft to 
be preferred for sovereignty protection and law 
enforcement tasks.
•	 Prior notification should be provided of major 
maritime operations to be conducted in the SCS.
•	 Hot lines should be established between the relevant 
naval and coast guard headquarters.
•	 Maritime security units operating in the SCS should 
recognise and be prepared to apply CUES.
•	 The International Convention for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) should always apply 
between ships operating in the SCS.
•	 Live fire endangering human life should not be used.
•	 Arrangements for the fair treatment of fishermen.
•	 Law enforcement operations in the SCS should be 
conducted in accordance with UNCLOS and other 
relevant international conventions
Operational and Legal Considerations
The conference addressed operational and legal 
considerations with the provision of maritime security in the 
SCS, including naval and coast guard activities, information-
sharing, cooperative law enforcement, operational and legal 
issues and rules of engagement (ROE). Speakers made useful 
suggestions regarding potential measures for avoiding and 
managing incidents that might occur at sea between ships 
and aircraft of different countries.
While the conference acknowledged that naval exercises 
and coordinated or joint patrols can be a useful MCBM, it 
was also conscious that these activities have the potential to 
send destabilising messages if conducted in disputed areas. 
Also, inclusive exercises, if only by the inclusion of observers, 
are to be preferred over those involving a limited group 
of participants.
Effective maritime regimes require adherence to the 
legal principles of UNCLOS, as well as to other relevant 
international maritime treaties.  However, there are still 
many ‘grey areas’ with the law of the sea. This is particularly 
so with provisions relating to the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) regime.
Some dialogue towards common understandings of aspects 
of the law of the sea where uncertainty exists could be a 
worthwhile MCBM. The agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on a common interpretation of the 
regime of innocent passage is one precedent for this activity.
In this regard the conference noted the intention of the ARF to 
hold the Second ARF Seminar on UNCLOS as proposed by the 
Philippines and Australia.
Prospective MCBMs
This conference considered ideas for MCBMs based on 
previous proposals and the positions of key protagonists. 
It re-emphasised the importance of MCBMs and maritime 
cooperation as a ‘building block’ for more effective 
management of the SCS and its resources. 
It is easy to identify and talk about MCBMs; it is much 
harder to translate them into a plan for action. The national 
perspectives of the countries littoral to the SCS and other 
stakeholder countries vary considerably. Central to the way 
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interest of regional countries in the SCS, its resources and 
trade routes, and their importance to regional economies.
The conference saw merit in establishing an Advisory Group 
of industry representatives, including representatives of 
regional industry associations where such associations exist, 
to provide input to regional discussions on SCS issues. This 
Group might be established under the umbrella of ASEAN-
China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the SCS.
Joint Development
Many speakers at the conference referred to the potential 
for the joint development of the resources of the SCS and 
the need to keep talking about it. Reference was made to 
the potential for pursuing further joint development in 
areas where there were only two claimants, as well as to the 
possibility of non-spatial joint development, such as scientific 
research to assess the resource potential of different areas.
Fisheries
Fisheries are an important economic interest of SCS littoral 
countries but they have become politicised. They are 
primarily managed on a national basis whereas cooperative 
management is essential to their sustainability. Agreed 
rules and standards for regional fish stocks are lacking, 
and there is no effective Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (RFMO) for the SCS. Some participants saw 
merit in extending current successful bilateral agreements to 
multilateral arrangements.
Assistance from non-littoral countries to help build the 
capacity of littoral countries for fisheries management was 
another possibility. 
An Activity Audit?
There is much talk in the region at present at both the 
bilateral and multilateral levels about the situation in 
the SCS, as well as some successful examples of bilateral 
cooperation in particular. A reference handbook detailing 
just what is going on in the region at present to resolve 
the disputes in the SCS and to put in place cooperative 
arrangements would enhance both dialogue and awareness 
among stakeholders. It might be a useful guide to best 
practice in maritime cooperation, while also promoting 
synergy between, and leading to some rationalising, of 
current efforts.
•	 Countries should provide information and contact 
details for agencies conducting law enforcement 
operations in the SCS.
•	 Regular exchanges of visits between the 
headquarters’ staffs of regional maritime law 
enforcement agencies, including reciprocal ship-
rider programmes.
•	 The guidelines are without prejudice to the 
sovereignty claims.
Civil Maritime Security Forces
The conference noted that most law enforcement now in the 
SCS is carried out by civil maritime security forces, such as 
coast guards (‘white hulls’). Law enforcement is not the ‘core 
business’ of regional navies.
The conference saw merit when developing MCBMs to think 
separately about ones applicable to civil law enforcement 
forces and the military MCBMs for naval forces. Military 
activities usually involve a higher level of risk whereas the 
activities of civil forces are more routine in nature, including a 
need for everyday exchanges between counties with adjacent 
or over-lapping jurisdictions. These activities are potentially 
less sensitive than naval activities.
Consideration might be given to establishing a forum where 
the civil maritime security forces of littoral countries meet 
together to discuss issues of common interest, including 
the prevention of transnational maritime crime, search and 
rescue, and the prevention and mitigation of ship-sourced 
marine pollution. These activities relate to the obligations 
of littoral countries under Part IX of UNCLOS and should 
proceed regardless of whether or not there is a binding 
Code of Conduct or any resolution of the sovereignty 
disputes. It was also important that clear divisions of 
responsibility should exist between the various agencies with 
maritime interests.
Private Sector Involvement
The conference noted that at this stage, private sector 
interests such as the oil and gas, shipping and fishing 
industries had little or no direct involvement in government-
government discussions about the SCS. These industries are 
all important components of the development programs 
of countries littoral to the SCS. Some dialogue between 
economists and strategists might reinforce the common 
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Closing Comment
The conference provided a valuable opportunity for the 
exchange of views and interaction between participants 
representing a range of different view-points on the situation 
in the SCS. It was encouraging to hear the positive views 
of speakers with success stories about countries working 
together on common interests to resolve the problems of 
the SCS.
The conference included subject matter experts who 
were able to bring their expertise to bear in developing a 
potentially fruitful list of prospective MCBMs for the SCS. 
The active engagement of all participants contributed to the 
success of the conference.
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Acronyms and abbreviations
APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBM confidence building measure
COBSEA Coordinating Body for the Seas of East Asia
CSBM confidence and security building measure
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CUES Communications for Unalerted Encounters at Sea
DOC Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South  
 China Sea
EEZ exclusive economic zone
IRGCN Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
IUU illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing 
fishing
KAAOT Kwar Abd Allah Oil Terminal
MCBM maritime confidence building measure
MSP Malacca Strait Patrols
PEMSEA Partnerships in Environmental Management for the  
 Sea of East Asia
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating  
 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the  
 Asia–Pacific
RSIS S Rajaratnam School of International Studies,  
 Singapore
SAR search and rescue
SCS South China Sea
UN United Nations
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium
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MARITIME CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA  
PROGRAM
InterContinental Hotel, Sydney 
11–13 August 2013
•	 The objective of the meeting is to develop proposals for prospective MCBMs for the South China Sea (SCS)
•	 The measures may be taken forward through an appropriate regional forum, possibly the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) Plus 
•	 The meeting will assess:
– The potential for increased maritime cooperation in the SCS in functional areas, such as law enforcement, search and 
rescue (SAR), hydrographic surveying, humanitarian assistance, marine safety, fisheries, marine environmental protection, 
marine scientific research, joint development etc, and
– Possible procedures for avoiding and managing incidents that might occur at sea between ships and aircraft of different 
countries.
Sunday 11 August 2013
18:00 – 20:00 Welcome Cocktail Reception 
and Event Registration
Harbour Room, Level 31, InterContinental Hotel, Sydney 
Monday 12 August 2013
Fort Macquarie Room, Level 2, InterContinental Hotel, Sydney
09:00 – 10:00 Introduction Peter Jennings, Executive Director ASPI; Conference Chair
Opening: Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Keynote Address: Prof. Hasjim DJALAL, Indonesia
10:00 – 10:30 Break
10:30 – 12:30 Session One 
Setting the Scene – Concepts of 
MCBMs
This session will provide an overview of the nature and types of maritime confidence 
building measures (MCBMs) and maritime regimes with a summary of existing 
regional MCBMs, the Code for Unalerted Encounters between Ships (CUES) 
developed by the Western Naval Symposium (WPNS), MALINDO (the INCSEA between 
Malaysia and Indonesia), the Military Maritime Consultative Arrangements (MMCA) 
(between China and US), INCSEAs between Russia and South Korea and Russia and 
Japan) etc.
Lead Speakers 
Nature and types of MCBMs  
Dr Sam BATEMAN, University of Wollongong
Maritime Regime Building for the SCS  
Dr Mark VALENCIA, private maritime consultant, United States
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Panellists
WPNS and CUES  
Captain Justin JONES, Seapower Centre, Australia
US-China Military Maritime Consultations (MMCA)  
Mr ZHAO Qinghai, China Institute of International Studies
MCBMs in NE Asia 
Dr Sukjoon YOON, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
MCBMs in Southeast Asia  
Captain Martin SEBASTIAN, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)
Discussion
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch
13:30 – 15:30 Session Two
Maritime cooperation in the SCS 
(bilateral and multilateral)
This session will address issues associated with functional cooperation, including 
previous cooperative efforts, current state of maritime cooperation and prospective 
areas for cooperation -– with a focus on the obligations to cooperate in UNCLOS Part 
IX, and those identified in the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct of Parties 
in the SCS. Speakers and panellists are asked to make suggestions regarding how 
functional cooperation might be improved.
Lead speakers 
ASEAN-China Maritime Cooperation  
Dr WU Shicun, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, PRC
Civil Maritime Cooperation in the SCS  
Mr Carl BAKER, Pacific Forum CSIS
Panellists 
Fisheries  
Dr NGUYEN Lan Anh, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Marine scientific research  
Dr Lowell BAUTISTA, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and 
Security, University of Wollongong
Hydrographic surveying 
CDRE Brett BRACE RAN, Australian Hydrographic Service
Marine environmental protection  
Professor Jay BATONGBACAL, University of the Philippines
Joint Development of Oil and Gas Resources 
Mr Leo BERNARD, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore
Discussion
15:30 – 15:45 Break
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15:45 – 17:30 Session Three 
Operational and Legal 
Considerations
This session will focus on maritime security in the South China Sea, including naval 
and coast guard activities, information-sharing, cooperative law enforcement, 
operational and legal issues and rules of engagement (ROE). Speakers and 
panellists are asked in particular to address ideas and suggestions regarding 
potential measures for avoiding and managing incidents that might occur at sea 
between ships and aircraft of different countries.
Lead speaker 
Cooperation for good order at sea  
Dr TRAN TRUONG Thuy, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Panellists 
Maritime Information Sharing  
Jane CHAN,  Maritime Security Programme,  RSIS, Singapore 
Inter-agency coordination (both national and regional)  
Lieutenant Colonel Arief MEIDYANTO, Bakorkamla, Indonesia
Ocean Policy Research Foundation EEZ Guidelines 
RADM (Rtd) AKIMOTO Kazumine, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan
Cooperation for maritime security and avoiding and managing incidents at sea 
Dr LI Mingjiang, RSIS, Singapore
Discussion
19:00 – 22:30 Conference Dinner Utzon Room, Sydney Opera House
Dinner Speaker: Vice Admiral Ray Griggs AO CSC RAN, Chief of Navy, Australia
Tuesday 13 August 2013
Fort Macquarie Room, Level 2, InterContinental Hotel, Sydney
09:00 – 12:00 Session Four
Prospective MCBMs
This session will develop ideas for MCBMs based on previous proposals and positions 
of key protagonists. It will re-emphasise the importance of MCBMs and maritime 
cooperation as a ‘building block’ for more effective management of the SCS and 
its resources. The lead speakers are asked to set the scene for a general discussion 
of key issues, while the panellists should provide a brief response from their 
national perspective.
Lead speaker 
Overview of the need for confidence-building in the South China Sea 
Mr KWA Chong Guan, RSIS, Singapore
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Panellists 
China 
Dr WU Shicun
Malaysia 
Captain Martin A. SEBASTIAN
Philippines 
Dr Jay BATONGBACAL
Vietnam 
Dr TRAN TRUONG Thuy
Indonesia 
Prof Hasjim DJALAL
Australia 
Captain Justin JONES, RAN
US 
Mr Carl BAKER
Discussion
12:00 – 12:30 Chairman’s Summation
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch
Meeting Close
Important disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the 
understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the 
contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.
About Special Reports
Generally written by ASPI experts, Special Reports are intended to deepen understanding on critical questions facing key strategic decision-
makers and, where appropriate, provide policy recommendations. In some instances, material of a more technical nature may appear in this 
series, where it adds to the understanding of the issue at hand. Special Reports reflect the personal views of the author(s), and do not in any 
way express or reflect the views of the Australian Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.
ASPI 
Tel +61 2 6270 5100 
Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 
Email enquiries@aspi.org.au 
Web www.aspi.org.au
ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.
© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2013
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means 
(electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted 
without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.
Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, Universities, and TAFE’s) are granted 
permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.
RRP $5.00   ISSN 2200-6648
